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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Gadgets and Gaussians in Lattice-Based Cryptography
by
Nicholas James Genise
Doctor of Philosophy in Electrical Engineering (Communication Theory and Systems)
University of California San Diego, 2019
Professor Daniele Micciancio, Chair
Professor Young-Han Kim, Co-Chair
This dissertation explores optimal algorithms employed in lattice-based cryptographic
schemes. Chapter 3 focuses on optimizing discrete gaussian sampling on “gadget” and algebraic
lattices. These gaussian sampling algorithms are used in lattice-cryptography’s most efficient
trapdoor mechanism for the SIS and LWE problems: “MP12” trapdoors. However, this trapdoor
mechanism was previously not optimized and inefficient (or not proven to be statistically correct)
for structured lattices (ring-SIS/LWE), lattice-cryptography’s most efficient form, where the
modulus is often a prime. The algorithms in this chapter achieve optimality in this regime and
have (already) resulted in a drastic efficiency improvement in independent implementations.
xii
Chapter 4 digs deeper into the gadget lattice’s associated algorithms. Specifically, we
explore efficiently sampling a simple subgaussian distribution on gadget lattices, and we optimize
LWE decoding on gadget lattices. These subgaussian sampling algorithms correspond to a
randomized bit-decomposition needed in lattice-based schemes with homomorphic properties
like fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). Next, we introduce a general class of “Chinese
Remainder Theorem” (CRT) gadgets. These gadgets allow advanced lattice-based schemes to
avoid multi-precision arithmetic when the applications modulus is larger than 64 bits.
The algorithms presented in the first two chapters improve the efficiency of many lattice-
based cryptosystems: digital signature schemes, identity-based encryption schemes, as well as
more advanced schemes like fully-homomorphic encryption and attribute-based encryption.
In the final chapter, we take a closer look at the random matrices used in trapdoor lattices.
First, we revisit the constants in the concentration bounds of subgaussian random matrices. Then,
we provide experimental evidence for a simple heuristic regarding the singular values of matrices
with entries drawn from commonly used distributions in cryptography. Though the proofs in this
chapter are dense, cryptographers need a strong understanding of the singular values of these
matrices since their maximum singular value determines the concrete security of the trapdoor
scheme’s underlying SIS problem.
xiii
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
A fundamental consequence of Shor’s algorithm [78] is the inevitable insecurity of
today’s number-theoretic cryptography if large-scale quantum computers are built. An entire
subfield of cryptography, which this dissertation lies, is dedicated to the advancement of efficient
cryptosystems that are secure even when the adversary is in possession of a quantum computer
(known as post-quantum cryptography). To date, lattice-based cryptography is the strongest
post-quantum candidate. A lattice is a group of periodic points in Euclidean space. Though
lattices were first used in cryptography to break cryptosystems [58], Ajtai [4] and Regev’s [75]
breakthroughs, respectively named the short integer solution problem (SIS) and the learning with
errors problem (LWE), demonstrated cryptographic building blocks from lattice problems which
admit proofs of average-case hardness from worst-case hardness assumptions. These proofs are
seemingly unique to lattices. In short, they provide strong evidence one can pick keys in certain
lattice-based schemes at random without worry.
Besides security against quantum attacks, another strength of lattices is the many ad-
vanced cryptosystems one can build from lattice assumptions, like SIS, LWE, and NTRU [56].
For a number of powerful cryptographic primitives, the only known constructions are based on
lattices. These schemes include fully homomorphic encryption [77, 44, 26, 25, 29, 28, 47] (where
a server can compute on encrypted data without the decryption key), and homomorphic digital
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signatures [18, 50] (a secure method for verifying an experiment was honestly computed from a
public data set). In addition, lattices yield advanced constructions like identity-based encryption
(a user’s public key is simply their name/identity) [46], as well as fine-grained access schemes
like attribute-based encryption (ABE) [19] and constraint-hiding constrained pseudorandom
functions [21, 33] (schemes where a user’s key allows decryption of subsets of the encrypted
data), all of which are believed to be secure against quantum threats.
Today, there is a great effort to introduce specialized algorithms specifically aimed
at improving practical implementations [45, 22]. These specialized algorithms are mostly
used in advanced lattice-based schemes like fully homomorphic encryption and attribute-based
encryption. However, they often serve as building blocks used in simpler schemes like digital
signatures or identity-based encryption.
This dissertation improves the efficiency of many of these schemes through optimizing
the underlying lattice algorithms in the state-of-the-art lattice trapdoor procedures [66], as well as
optimizing the gadget-related algorithms at the heart of nearly all of lattice-based cryptography’s
schemes with advanced, homomorphic properties.
1.2 Results
Our first contribution is the optimization of trapdoor discrete gaussian sampler for the
SIS trapdoors of [66] for an arbitrary modulus q. Previously, the discrete gaussian sampling
algorithm for SIS trapdoors was only optimized when the modulus was a power of two, q = 2k.
This is undesirable, for advanced primitives can only be efficiently implemented in the ring
setting [64], where the modulus is large (polynomial-sized) prime or the product primes with
each prime around 64 bits. Specifically for this contribution, we are concerned with sampling
the gadget lattice, or “G-lattice,” which is, more or less, a bit-decomposition lattice with ideal
decoding properties that depends on the modulus q. The gadget sampler employs a novel idea:
factor the G-lattice’s basis into sparse, triangular matrices, sample a discrete gaussian on the first
2
matrix’s lattice, then use the second matrix as an efficient linear transformation.
Our next contribution is giving an efficient perturbation sampling algorithm [72] special-
ized over the ring setting [64]. This algorithm is an FFT-like [36] algorithm which computes
the FFO [41] matrix factorization on-the-fly resulting in less memory consumption than the
algorithm [41] which can be adapted to a discrete gaussian sampler. Further, we prove the
statistical correctness of our algorithm. This latter fact is crucial for applications, since the theo-
retical breakthrough of using discrete gaussian sampling in lattice trapdoors is that the preimages
statistically hide the trapdoor [46]. Our statistical analysis uses a new convolution theorem via
the Schur-complement decomposition of the lattice basis [80]. This analysis is represented in
Theorem 3.4.1. It avoids the technicalities of the standard discrete gaussian convolution theorem
[72] and is well-suited for our recursive algorithm. These contributions are given in-detail in
Chapter 3 and are published in [42].
Our next contribution is the optimization of gadget-lattice algorithms [66, 11]. These
include randomized bit-decompositions (subgaussian sampling) [10] and LWE decoding [66].
Both of these algorithms use the sparse matrix factorization from Chapter 3. The subgaussian
sampling algorithm follows the same algorithmic blueprint as the discrete gaussian sampler
introduced earlier in this dissertation: sample and map via the sparse matrices in the basis’
factorization. The distribution sampled is a simple randomized rounding version of Babai’s
nearest plane algorithm [13] where we round to the nearest plane with probability according to
the target’s distance from the plane.
In addition, we introduce a general set of gadgets specifically tailored for the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT) setting. Specifically, the CRT setting is when a modulus is chosen
so homomorphic computations can be performed over the CRT isomorphism, in-parallel. This
allows implementations of advanced lattice-based schemes to keep arithmetic under the native
64 bits native in modern machines, hence avoiding multi-precision numbers, when the modulus
has primes factors all under 64 bits. This trick can be used further in the ring setting by factoring
the primes over the underlying ring of integers in the scheme [45]. These CRT gadget matrices
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allow for parallel computations in gaussian sampling (using the algorithms from Chapter 3),
subgaussian sampling, and LWE decoding (the latter two algorithms are introduced in Chapter 4).
These CRT algorithms are crucial for the practical efficiency of lattice-based schemes since one
can merely increase the modulus (more memory and parallelism) while keeping efficient 64-bit
arithmetic. We implement our algorithms in the PALISADE library [73], an open source lattice
cryptography library. We demonstrate the practical impact of our algorithms by showing a nearly
300x speedup in an attribute-based encryption scheme’s ciphertext evaluation times [19]. These
contributions (gadget algorithms) are published in [43].
The last contribution is an in-depth analysis of the subgaussian matrices used in lattice-
based trapdoors [11, 66]. The underlying system parameters of many lattice-based schemes
depend on the trapdoor matrix’s largest singular value. Unfortunately, the state-of-the-art in sub-
gaussian analysis [79] has unknown constants floating around in its singular value concentration
bounds. This unknown constant directly affects the concrete security of the scheme since the
hardness of the underlying SIS problem scales with this singular value. Our contributions here
are two-fold: first to prove a concentration bound with exact constants, then we experimentally
evaluate the constants appearing in the commonly used distributions in lattice-based schemes.
These are presented in Chapter 5.
1.3 Outline
The next chapter covers basic definitions used throughout the dissertation. Then, Chap-
ter 3 includes the discrete gaussian sampling algorithms: gadget and perturbation sampling. Next,
we present the lattice gadget toolkit in Chapter 4. This includes the subgaussian sampling and
LWE decoding algorithms as well as the general class of CRT gadgets. Lastly, our subgaussian
matrix analysis is presented in Chapter 5.
4
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
2.1 Linear Algebra
The (forward) Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of an ordered set of linearly independent
vectors B = {b1, . . . ,bk} is B˜ = {b˜1, . . . , b˜k} where each b˜i is the component of bi orthogonal
to span(b1, . . . ,bi−1) (and the backward GSO is defined as b†i = bi ⊥ span(bi+1, . . . ,bn)). An
anti-cylic matrix is an n×n matrix of the form

a0 −an−1 . . . −a1
a1 a0 . . . −a2
...
... . . .
...
an−1 an−2 . . . a0

.
For any two (symmetric) matrices Σ,Γ ∈ Rn×n, we write Σ Γ if xT (Σ−Γ)x≥ 0 for all
(nonzero) vectors x ∈ Rn, and Σ  Γ if xT (Σ−Γ)x > 0. It is easy to check that  is a partial
order relation. Relations  and ≺ are defined symmetrically. When one of the two matrices
Γ= sI is scalar, we simply write Σ s or Σ s. A symmetric matrix Σ ∈Rn×n is called positive
definite if Σ 0, and positive semidefinite if Σ 0. Equivalently, Σ is positive semidefinite if
and only if it can be written as Σ= BBT for some (square) matrix B, called a square root of Σ
and denoted B =
√
Σ. (Notice that any Σ  0 has infinitely many square roots B =√Σ.) Σ is
positive definite if and only if its square root B is a square non-singular matrix. When B is upper
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(resp. lower) triangular, the factorization Σ= BBT is called the upper (resp. lower) triangular
Cholesky decomposition of Σ. The Cholesky decomposition of any positive definite Σ ∈ Rn×n
can be computed with O(n3) floating point arithmetic operations. For any scalar s, Σ s if and
only if all eigenvalues of Σ are strictly greater than s. In particular, positive definite matrices are
nonsingular.
For any n×n matrix S and non-empty index sets I,J ⊆ {1, . . . ,n}, we write S[I,J] for
the |I|× |J| matrix obtained by selecting the elements at positions (i, j) ∈ I× J from S. When
I = J, we write S[I] as a shorthand for S[I, I]. For any nonsingular matrix S ∈ Rn×n and index
partition I∪ I¯ = {1, . . . ,n}, I∩ I¯ = /0, the I× I matrix
S/I = S[I]−S[I, I¯] ·S[I¯]−1 ·S[I¯, I]
is called the Schur complement of S[I¯], often denoted by S/S[I¯] = S/I. In particular, if S = A B
BT D
 then the Schur complement of A is the matrix S/A=D−BT A−1B. For any index set
I, a symmetric matrix S is positive definite if and only if both S[I] and its Schur’s complement
S/S[I] are positive definite.
Let Σ=
 A B
BT D
 0. We can factor Σ in terms of a principal submatrix, say D, and its
Schur complement, Σ/D = A−BD−1BT , as follows:
Σ=
I BD−1
0 I

Σ/D 0
0 D

 I 0
D−1BT I
 .
The next two theorems regarding the spectra of principal submatrices and Schur comple-
ments of positive definite matrices are used in the analysis of our algebraic discrete Gaussian
sampling algorithms. In both theorems, λi is the ith (in non-increasing order, with multiplicity)
eigenvalue of a symmetric matrix.
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Theorem 2.1.1 (Cauchy) For any symmetric matrix S ∈ Rn×n, I ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} and 1≤ i≤ |I|
λi(S)≥ λi(S[I])≥ λi+n−|I|(S).
Theorem 2.1.2 ([80, Corollary 2.3]) For any positive definite Σ ∈ Rn×n, I ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} and
1≤ i≤ |I|
λi(Σ)≥ λi(Σ/I)≥ λi+n−|I|(Σ).
In other words, the eigenvalues of principal submatrices and Schur complements of a positive
definite matrix are bounded from below and above by the smallest and largest eigenvalues of the
original matrix.
Theorem 2.1.3 (Gersˇgorin) Let M be an n×n matrix with complex entries. For each row i, let
ri be the sum of its non-diagonal entries’ magnitudes: ri = ∑ j 6=i |M(i, j)|. Then, the eigenvalues
of M are all in ⋃
i
{z ∈ C : |z−M(i, i)| ≤ ri}.
2.2 Lattices
A lattice is a discrete subgroup of Rn. Equivalently, a lattice Λ can be represented as
the set of all integer combinations of a basis B = [b1, · · · ,bk] ∈ Zn×k, Λ= {∑k1 zibi : zi ∈ Z}=
L (B). Notice that any permutation of basis vectors is another lattice basis. In fact, any matrix
U ∈ GL(k,Z) gives a new basis B′ = BU. Hence, any lattice k > 1 has infinitely many basis
matrices. We only consider full-rank lattices (k = n). A lattice is an integer lattice if it is a
subgroup of Zn. The dual lattice of Λ, denoted as Λ∗, is the set Λ∗ = {z ∈ Rn : 〈z,Λ〉 ⊆ Z}.
Given a basis B for Λ, its dual basis is B−t which is also a basis for Λ∗. We will consider direct
sums of lattices, Λ= Λ1⊕·· ·⊕Λl and their dual lattices Λ∗ = Λ∗1⊕·· ·⊕Λ∗l . The number λi(Λ)
is the radius of the smallest ball containing i linearly independent lattice vectors.
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Given a basis B = [b1, · · · ,bn] for a lattice Λ, its (forward) Gram-Schmidt orthogonal-
ization (GSO) is the set of vectors B˜ = [b˜1, · · · , b˜n] where b˜i is the component of bi orthogonal
to span(b1, · · · ,bi−1). The GSO is not another basis for the lattice in-general, but it gives us a
tiling of Rn given by Rn = ∪x∈Λ(x+P1/2(B˜)) whereP1/2(B˜) := B˜ · (−1/2,1/2]n. Note that
the GSO depends on the order of the vectors given. We define the reverse order GSO analogously.
The algorithms presented in this dissertation will all be instantiations of Babai’s greedy decoding
algorithm known as the nearest plane algorithm [13].
Theorem 2.2.1 There is an algorithm which given B, B˜, t ∈ Rn returns the unique lattice point
in t+P1/2(B∗) in time O(n2) and memory O(n3)1.
2.3 Discrete and Subgaussians
Let A⊂ Rn be a discrete set, and let the (spherical) Gaussian function with width s and
center c ∈ Rn be ρs,c(x) = exp(−pi‖x− c‖2/s2). Let ρs,c(A) = ∑y∈Aρs,c(y). The smoothing
parameter of a lattice [67] for some ε > 0, is dentoted as ηε(Λ), and it is defined as the minimum
s > 0 such that ρ(s ·Λ∗) ≤ 1+ ε . When s = 1 and c = 0, we denote this as ρ(·). Then, the
discrete Gaussian distribution has probability ρs,c(x)/ρs,c(A) for each x ∈ A. This distribution is
denoted as DA,s,c. Polynomial time discrete Gausisan sampling algorithms for general lattices
and their cosets, with width above the GSO length of the input basis (times a small factor,
ω(
√
logn) or O(
√
logn)), are given in [46, 27].
Subgaussian distributions
Subgaussian distributions are those on R which have tails dominated by gaussians [79].
An equivalent formulation is through a distribution’s moment generating function, and the
definition below is most-commonly used throughout lattice-based cryptography [66, 65].
1This assumes the GSO has entries each described in O(n) bits, but often we use floating point numbers in
implementations.
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Definition 2.3.1 A random variable X over the reals is subgaussian with parameter s> 0 if for
all t ∈ R, it holds
E[e2pitX ]≤ epis2t2.
From here we can derive the gaussian concentration bound.
Corollary 2.3.1 A subgaussian random variable, X, with parameter s> 0 satisfies
Pr{|X | ≥ t} ≤ 2exp(−pit2/s2)
for all t > 0.
Proof: Let δ ∈ R be arbitrary. Then,
Pr{X ≥ t}= Pr{exp(2piδX)≥ exp(2piδ t)} ≤ exp(−2piδ t) ·E[exp(2piδX)]
≤ exp(−2piδ t+piδ 2s2).
This is minimized at δ = t/s2, so we have
Pr{X ≥ t} ≤ exp(−pit2/s2).
The symmetric case, X ≤−t, is analogous and the proof is completed by a union bound. 
A random vector x over Rn is subgaussian with parameter α > 0 if 〈x,u〉 is subgaussian
with parameter α for all unit vectors u. If each coefficient of a random vector is subgaussian
with parameter α conditioned on the previous coefficients taking any values, then the vector is
subgaussian with parameter α .
Lemma 2.3.1 Let x be a discrete random vector over Rn such that each coordinate xi is subgaus-
sian with parameter αi given the previous coordinates take any values. Then, x is a subgaussian
vector with parameter maxi{αi}.
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Proof: We expand the moment generating function:
E[exp(2pit 〈x,u〉)] =∑
χ
Pr{x = (χ1, · · · ,χn)}exp(2pit 〈χ,u〉)
≤ exp(pit2∑
i
α2i u
2
i )
≤ exp(pit2 max
i
αi2‖u‖2).

2.4 Gadgets
A gadget lattice is described by a matrix G ∈ Zn×nkq and the lattice itself, often called
the “G-lattice,” is the set Λ⊥q (G) = {x ∈ Znk : Gx = 0 mod q}. All gadget matrices, G, in this
dissertation have the same block-diagonal form: G := In⊗ gt for some gt . This allows us to
focus on the smaller lattice Λ⊥q (gt) since
Λ⊥q (G) = Λ
⊥
q (g
t)⊕·· ·⊕Λ⊥q (gt), n times.
The most common gadget is the power-of-b gadget gt := (1,b,b2, · · · ,bk−1) where k := dlogb qe.
This lattice has a simple basis
Bq =

b q0
−1 b q1
−1 . . . ...
. . . b qk−2
−1 qk−1

where (q0, . . . ,qk−1) = [q]kb = q is the base-b representation of the modulus q. We cheat when
q = bk and say q = (0, · · · ,0,b). Notice that for a fixed b,k, all gadget lattices have the same
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k−1-dimensional sublattice generated by the basis’ first k−1 columns. Despite these lattices
being almost the same, this last dimension, defined by q, has a significant impact on the efficiency
of Babai’s nearest plane algorithm [13] on Λ⊥q (gt). This is because the reverse GSO of Bq is
dense whenever q 6= bk.
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Chapter 3
Discrete Gaussian Sampling on Algebraic
and Gadget Lattices
3.1 Introduction
We present improved algorithms for gaussian preimage sampling using the lattice trap-
doors of [66], called “MP12 trapdoors” throughout this dissertation. For simplicity, we view the
trapdoor scheme through the lens of a hash-and-sign digital signature scheme [46]. The scheme’s
verification key is an SIS matrix A ∈ Zn×mq (short and fat since m≥ n logq) and the signing key
is a randomly chosen matrix with small entries T. Signing is done by hashing a message with a
random salt H(m||r) = u ∈ Znq, and using the trapdoor to return a short, gaussian vector x ∈ Zm
satisfying1
Ax mod q = u & ‖x‖2 = “short”≤ β .
MP12 trapdoor sampling consist of two discrete gaussian sampling steps:
1. online discrete gaussian sampling on message-dependent shift of a public gadget lattice,
and
2. an offline perturbation sampling which only depends on the trapdoor T.
1We hide the trapdoor and gadget in A by sampling A,T together as A = [A′|G−A′T] mod q where A′ is a
truly random matrix. A is close to statistically random by the left-over hash lemma. Now, we can sign a message by
sampling a perturbation p and sampling a short y satisfying Gy= u−Ap mod q. The final signature is x := p+Ty.
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Table 3.1. Running time and storage of the (G-sampling) algorithm. G-Sampling running times
are scaled by a factor n to take into account that each sample requires n independent calls to the
underlying G-sampling operation.
MP12 MP12 This work
modulus q 2k any any
G-Sampling precomp. — O(log3 q) —
G-Sampling space O(logq) O(log2 q) O(logq)
G-Sampling time O(n logq) O(n log2 q) O(n logq)
Optimizing the online stage is most crucial for applications since we can always precompute and
store perturbations (whereas there are qn different possible signatures u).
Contribution
We present a new algorithm for the online sampling stage capable of handling any
modulus q (including the large prime moduli required in the ring setting) while achieving the
same level of performance of the specialized discrete gaussian algorithm of [66] for a power-of-
two modulus q = 2k. This improves the running time of [66] for arbitrary modulus from cubic
log3 q (or quadratic log2 q, using precomputation and a substantial amount of storage) to just
linear in logq and with minimal storage requirements. These G-sampling improvements are
summarized in Table 3.1.
The second contribution of this chapter is an optimized discrete gaussian sampling on
structured lattices, or equivalently an efficient algorithm to sample the integer lattice with a
structure covariance. The covariances in MP12’s ring-SIS/LWE perturbations have blocks
corresponding to polynomial multiplication over a finite-dimensional polynomial ring, R =
Z[x]/(xn+1). A similar algorithm can be adapted from Ducas and Prest [41], though without a
proof of statistical correctness. Further, the algorithm presented here is more memory efficient
(linear space consumption versus quasi-linear space) than the adapting from Ducas and Prest’s
algorithm [41]. We emphasize that the proof of statistical correctness is critical for applications
since the preimages provided by MP12 cannot leak information about the trapdoor. Otherwise,
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the attacks of Nguyen and Regev could recover the trapdoor [69].
Technical details
The main idea behind our efficient gaussian sampling algorithm is quite simple. Surpris-
ingly, the commonly used basis of the (power-of-b) gadget lattice, denoted Bq, has a factorization
allowing us to efficiently sample a different lattice:
Bq = BD.
Both B and D are sparse and triangular, so we can sample a discrete gaussian on the G-lattice by
1. sampling a discrete gaussian on the lattice generated by D,
2. and apply B as a linear transformation.
The matrix D has entries in [0,1], so we can sample a narrow discrete gaussian on the lattice
generated by D, and the matrix B has small entries, so the width of the distribution is not
increased by much when we use B as a linear transformation. This also applies when q = bk
since D = Ik when q = bk, but the algorithm of Micciancio and Peikert [66] is much simpler
in this case. Further, we add a perturbation, like Peikert’s algorithm [72], to get a spherical
sample. We have this perturbation step not for security but for efficiency in generating the offline
perturbations.
Next, our algebraic perturbation algorithm follows the simple recursive structure of
fast-Fourier transform [36]. That is, we view the n-dimensional ring R = Z[x]/(xn+1) as a two
dimensional module over the smaller n/2-dimensional ring. Algorithmically, this is done to a
change of basis corresponding to the Schur complement [80] and a convolution [72].
The actual steps are quite technical. Though, we needed to prove a new convolution
theorem suited more towards these Schur complement convolutions. We emphasize that a
proof of statistical correctness is crucial for applications, since we need to trapdoor samples to
statistically hide the trapdoor [46].
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In addition, we sketch how one would compute the perturbations in the canonical embed-
ding for non-power-of-two cyclotomic rings. The algorithm is much simpler in the canonical
embedding due to its diagonal structure of multiplication matrices.
3.2 Background
We denote the complex numbers as C, the real numbers as R, the rational numbers as
Q, and the integers as Z. A number is denoted by a lower case letter, z ∈ Z for example. We
denote the conjugate of a complex number y as y∗. When q is a positive integer, logq is short for
its rounded up logarithm in base two, dlog2 qe. A floating point number with mantissa length m
representing x ∈R is denoted as x¯. The index set of the first n natural numbers is [n] = {1, . . . ,n}.
Vectors are denoted by bold lower case letters, v, and are in column form (vt is a row vector)
unless stated otherwise. The inner product of two vectors is 〈x,y〉= xty. We denote matrices
with bold upper case letters B or with upper case Greek letters (for positive-definite matrices).
The transpose of a matrix is Bt . The entry of B in row i and column j is denoted Bi, j. Unless
otherwise stated, the norm of a vector is the `2 norm. The norm of a matrix ‖B‖= maxi ‖bi‖ is
the maximum norm of its column vectors. Given two probability distributions over a countable
domain D, the statistical distance between them is ∆SD(X ,Y ) = 12 ∑ω∈D |X(ω)−Y (ω)|. In order
to avoid tracing irrelevant terms in our statistical distance computations, we define εˆ = ε+O(ε2).
We denote a random variable x sampled from a distribution D as x← D . A random
variable distributed as D is denoted x ∼ D . We denote an algorithm A with oracle access to
another algorithmB (distribution D) as A B (A D ).
The max-log, or ML, distance between two distributions was recently introduced by [68]
in order to prove tighter bounds for concrete security. The ML distance between two discrete
distributions over the same support, S, as
∆ML(P,Q) = max
x∈S
| lnQ(x)− lnP(x)|.
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LetP,Q be distributions over a countable domain again and let S be the support ofP .
The Re´nyi divergence of order infinity ofQ fromP is
R∞(P||Q) = max
x∈S
P(x)
Q(x)
.
Re´nyi divergence is used in [14] to yield a tighter security analysis than one using statistical
distance.
3.2.1 Gaussians and Lattices
A lattice Λ ⊂ Rn is a discrete subgroup of Rn. Specifically, a lattice of rank k is the
integer span L (B) = {z1b1 + · · ·+ zkbk | zi ∈ Z} of a basis B = {b1, . . . ,bk} ⊂ Rn (k ≤ n).
There are infinitely many bases for a given lattice since right-multiplying a basis by a unimodular
transformation gives another basis. The dual lattice of Λ, denoted by Λ∗, is the lattice {x ∈
span(Λ)| 〈x,Λ〉 ⊆ Z}. It is easy to see that B−t is a basis forL (B)∗ for a full rank lattice (n= k).
The n-dimensional gaussian function ρ :Rn→ (0,1] is defined as ρ(x) := exp(−pi‖x‖2).
Applying an invertible linear transformation B to the gaussian function yields
ρB(x) = ρ(B−1x) = exp(−pi ·xtΣ−1x)
with Σ= BBt  0. For any c ∈ span(B) = span(Σ), we also define the shifted gaussian function
(centered at c) as ρ√Σ,c(x)= ρ√Σ(x−c). Normalizing the function ρB,c(x) by the measure of ρB,c
over the span of B gives the continuous gaussian distribution with covariance Σ/(2pi), denoted
by D√Σ,c. Let S ⊂ Rn be any discrete set in Rn, then we define ρ√Σ(S) := ∑s∈Sρ√Σ(s). The
discrete gaussian distribution over a lattice Λ, denoted by DΛ,√Σ,c, is defined by restricting the
support of the distribution to Λ. Specifically, a sample y←DΛ,√Σ,c has probability mass function
ρ√Σ,c(x)/ρ√Σ,c(Λ) for all x ∈ Λ. Discrete gaussians on lattice cosets Λ+ c, for c ∈ span(Λ), are
defined similarly setting Pr{y← DΛ+c,√Σ,p} = ρ√Σ,p(y)/ρ√Σ,p(Λ+ c) for all y ∈ Λ+ c. For
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brevity we let DΛ+c,
√
Σ,p(y) := Pr{y← DΛ+c,√Σ,p}.
For a lattice Λ and any (typically small) positive ε > 0, the smoothing parameter ηε(Λ)
[67] is the smallest s> 0 such that ρ(s ·Λ∗)≤ 1+ε . A one-dimensional discrete gaussian with a
tail-cut, t, is a discrete gaussian DZ,c,s restricted to a support of Z∩ [c− t · s,c+ t · s]. We denote
this truncated discrete gaussian as DtZ,c,s. In order to use the ML distance in Section 3.3, we
will restrict all tail-cut discrete gaussians to a universal support of Z∩ [c− t · smax,c+ t · smax] for
some smax.
Lemma 3.2.1 ([46, Lemma 4.2]) For any ε > 0, any s≥ ηε(Z), and any t > 0,
Pr
x←DZ,s,c
[|x− c| ≥ t · s]≤ 2e−pit2 · 1+ ε
1− ε .
More generally, for any positive definite matrix Σ and lattice Λ ⊂ span(Σ), we write
√
Σ ≥ ηε(Λ), or Σ  η2ε (Λ), if ρ(
√
Σt ·Λ∗) ≤ 1+ ε . The reader is referred to [67, 46, 72] for
additional background on the smoothing parameter.
Here we recall two bounds and a discrete gaussian convolution theorem to be used later.
Lemma 3.2.2 ([46, Lemma 3.1]) Let Λ⊂ Rn be a lattice with basis B, and let ε > 0. Then,
ηε(Λ)≤ ‖B˜‖
√
log(2n(1+1/ε))/pi.
Lemma 3.2.3 ([72, Lemma 2.5]) For any full rank n-dimensional lattice Λ, vector c ∈ Rn, real
ε ∈ (0,1), and positive definite Σ η2ε (Λ),
ρ√Σ(Λ+ c) ∈
[
1− ε
1+ ε
,1
]
·ρ√Σ(Λ).
Theorem 3.2.1 ([72, Theorem 3.1]) For any vectors c1,c2 ∈ Rn, lattices Λ1,Λ2 ⊂ Rn, and
positive definite matrices Σ1,Σ2  0, Σ= Σ1+Σ2  0, Σ−13 = Σ−11 +Σ−12  0, if
√
Σ1  ηε(Λ1)
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and
√
Σ3  ηε(Λ2) for some 0< ε ≤ 1/2, then the distribution
X = {x | p← DΛ2+c2,√Σ2,x← DΛ1+c1,√Σ1,p}
is within statistical distance ∆(X ,Y )≤ 8ε from the discrete gaussian Y = DΛ1+c1,√Σ.
Below we have the correctness theorem for the standard, randomized version of Babai’s
nearest plane algorithm. The term statistically close is the standard cryptographic notion of
negligible statistical distance2. We emphasize that the algorithm reduces to sampling DZ,s,c.
Theorem 3.2.2 ([46, Theorem 4.1]) Given a full-rank lattice basis B ∈ Rn×n, a parameter
s≥‖B˜‖ω(√logn), and a center c∈Rn, there is an O(n2)-time, with a O(n3)-time preprocessing,
probabilistic algorithm whose output is statistically close to DL (B),s,c.
3.2.2 Cyclotomic Fields
Let n be a positive integer. The n-th cyclotomic field over Q is the number fieldKn =
Q[x]/(Φn(x)) ∼= Q(ζ ) where ζ is an n-th primitive root of unity and Φn(x) is the minimal
polynomial of ζ over Q. The nth cyclotomic ring is On = Z[x]/(Φn(x)). Let ϕ(n) be Euler’s
totient function. Kn is a ϕ(n)-dimensional Q-vector space, and we can viewKn as a subset of
C by viewing ζ as a complex primitive n-th root of unity.
Multiplication by a fixed element f , g 7→ f · g, is a linear transformation on Kn as a
Q-vector space. We will often view field elements as ϕ(n)-dimensional rational vectors via the
coefficient embedding. This is defined by f (x) = ∑ϕ(n)−1i=0 fix
i 7→ ( f0, · · · , fϕ(n)−1)t mapping a
field element to its vector of coefficients under the power basis {1,x, · · · ,xϕ(n)−1} (or equivalently
{1,ζ , · · · ,ζϕ(n)−1}). We can represent a field element as the matrix in Qϕ(n)×ϕ(n) representing
the linear transformation by its multiplication in the coefficient embedding. This matrix is called
2Precisely, a function f : N→ R≥0 is negligible if for every c > 1 there exists an N such that for all n > N,
f (n)< n−c.
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a field element’s coefficient multiplication matrix. When n is a power of two, an element’s
coefficient multiplication matrix is anti-cyclic.
An isomorphism from the field F to the field K is a bijection θ : F → K such that
θ( f g) = θ( f )θ(g), and θ( f + g) = θ( f ) + θ(g) for all f ,g ∈ F . An automorphism is an
isomorphism from a field to itself. For example, if we view the cyclotomic fieldKn as a subset
of the complex numbers, then the conjugation map f (ζ ) 7→ f (ζ )∗ = f (ζ ∗) is an automorphism
and can be computed in linear time O(n). In power-of-two cyclotomic fields, the conjugation of
a field element corresponds to the matrix transpose of an element’s anti-cyclic multiplication
matrix.
Another embedding is the canonical embedding which maps an element f ∈Kn to the
vector of evaluations of f , as a polynomial, at each root of Φn(x). When n is a power of two,
the linear transformation between the coefficient embedding and the canonical embedding is a
scaled isometry.
Let n be a power of two, then the fieldK2n is a two-dimensionalKn-vector space as see
by splitting a polynomial f (x) ∈K2n into f (x) = f0(x2)+ x · f1(x2) for fi ∈Kn. Now, we can
view the linear transformation given by multiplication by some f ∈K2n as a linear transformation
overKn⊕Kn ∼=K2n. Let φ2n :K2n→Qn×n be the injective ring homomorphism from the field
to an element’s anti-cyclic matrix. Then, we have the following relationship where P below
is a simple re-indexing matrix known as a stride permutation (increasing evens followed by
increasing odds in {0,1, . . . ,n−1}),
Pφn( f )Pt =
φn/2( f0) φn/2(x · f1)
φn/2( f1) φn/2( f0)
 .
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3.3 Sampling G-lattices
For any positive integers b≥ 2, k ≥ 1 and non-negative integer u< bk, we write [u]kb for
the base-b expansion of u, i.e., the unique vector (u0, . . . ,uk−1) with entries 0≤ ui < b such that
u = ∑i uibi. Typically, b = 2 and [u]k2 is just the k-digits binary representation of u, but larger
values of b may be used to obtain interesting efficiency trade-offs. Throughout this section,
we consider the values of b and k as fixed, and all definitions and algorithms are implicitly
parameterized by them.
In this section we study the so-called G-lattice sampling problem, i.e., the problem of
sampling the discrete Gaussian distribution on a lattice coset
Λ⊥u (g
t) = {z ∈ Zk : gtz = u mod q}
where q ≤ bk, u ∈ Zq, k = dlogb qe, and g = (1,b, . . . ,bk−1). G-lattice sampling is used in
many lattice schemes employing a trapdoor. Both schemes with polynomial modulus, like IBE
[24, 17, 3, 2], group signatures [62, 70, 63, 51], and others (double authentication preventing
and predicate authentication preventing signatures, constraint-hiding PRFs) [20, 33, 34], and
schemes with super-polynomial modulus [31, 32, 48, 23, 60, 50, 1] (ABE, watermarking, etc.),
use G-lattice sampling.
An efficient algorithm to solve this problem is given in [66] for the special case when
q = bk is a power of the base b. The algorithm, shown in Figure 3.1, is simple. This algorithm
reduces the problem of sampling the k-dimensional lattice coset Λ⊥u (gt) for u ∈ Zq to the much
simpler problem of sampling the one-dimensional lattice cosets u+bZ for u∈Zb. The simplicity
of the algorithm is due to the fact that, when q = bk is an exact power of b, the lattice Λ⊥(gt) has
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Algorithm 2: SampleG when q = bk.
Input: (q = bk,s = b ·ω(√logn),u)
Output: x∼ DΛ⊥u (gt),s.
1 for i = 0, · · · ,k−1 do
2 xi← DbZ+u,s.
3 u := (u− xi)/b ∈ Z.
4 return x = (x0, · · · ,xk−1).
Figure 3.1. A sampling algorithm for G-lattices when the modulus q is a perfect power of the
base b. The algorithm is implicitly parameterized by a base b and dimension k.
a special basis
Bbk =

b
−1 b
−1 . . .
. . . b
−1 b

which is sparse, triangular, and with small integer entries. (In particular, its Gram-Schmidt
orthogonalization B˜bk = bI is a scalar matrix.) As a result, the general lattice sampling algorithm
of [61, 46] (which typically requires O(k3)-time preprocessing, and O(k2) storage and online
running time) can be specialized to the much simpler algorithm in Figure 3.1 that runs in linear
time O(k), with minimal memory requirements and no preprocessing at all.
We give a specialized algorithm to solve the same sampling problem when q< bk is an
arbitrary modulus. This is needed in many cryptographic applications where the modulus q is
typically a prime. As already observed in [66] the lattice Λ⊥(gt) still has a fairly simple and
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sparse basis matrix
Bq =

b q0
−1 b q1
−1 . . . ...
. . . b qk−2
−1 qk−1

where (q0, . . . ,qk−1) = [q]kb = q is the base-b representation of the modulus q. This basis still has
good geometric properties, as all vectors in its (left-to-right) Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization
have length at most O(b). So, it can be used with the algorithm of [61, 46] to generate good-
quality gaussian samples on the lattice cosets with small standard deviation. However, since the
basis is no longer triangular, its Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization is not sparse anymore, and
the algorithm of [61, 46] can no longer be optimized to run in linear time as in Figure 3.1. In
applications where q = nO(1) is polynomial in the security parameter n, the matrix dimension
k = O(logn) is relatively small, and the general sampling algorithm (with O(k2) storage and
running time) can still be used with an acceptable (albeit significant) performance degradation.
However, for larger q this becomes prohibitive in practice. Moreover, even for small q, it would
be nice to have an optimal sampling algorithm with O(k) running time, linear in the matrix
dimension, as for the exact power case. Here we give such an algorithm, based on the convolution
methods of [72], but specialized with a number of concrete technical choices that result in a
simple and fast implementation, comparable to the specialized algorithm of [66] for the exact
power case.
The reader may notice that the alternating columns of Bq, b1,b3, . . . and b2,b4, . . . , are
pair-wise orthogonal. Let us call these sets B1 and B2, respectively. Then, another basis for
Λ⊥(gt) is (B1,B2,q) and this might suggest that the GSO of this basis is sparse. Unfortunately,
this leads to a GSO of (B1,B∗2,q
∗) where B∗2 is a dense, upper triangular block. Let b be the
i− th vector in B2. Then, there are 2+ i−1 non-orthogonal vectors to b preceding it in B1 and
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B∗2, filling in the upper portion of b˜.
Overview
The idea is the following. Instead of sampling Λ⊥u (gt) directly, we express the lattice
basis Bq = TD as the image (under a linear transformation T) of some other matrix D with
simple (sparse, triangular) structure. Next, we sample the discrete gaussian distribution (say,
with variance σ2) on an appropriate coset of L (D). Finally, we map the result back to the
original lattice applying the linear transformation T to it. Notice that, even ifL (D) is sampled
according to a spherical gaussian distribution, the resulting distribution is no longer spherical.
Rather, it follows an ellipsoidal gaussian distribution with (scaled) covariance σ2TTt . This
problem is solved using the convolution method of [72], i.e., initially adding a perturbation with
complementary covariance s2I−σ2TTt to the target, so that the final output has covariance
σ2TTt +(s2I−σ2TTt) = s2I. In summary, at a high level, the algorithm performs (at least
implicitly) the following steps:
1. Compute the covariance matrix Σ1 = TTt and an upper bound r on the spectral norm of
TTt
2. Compute the complementary covariance matrix Σ2 = r2I−Σ1
3. Sample p←DΛ1,σ√Σ2 , from some convenient lattice Λ1 using the Cholesky decomposition
of Σ2
4. Compute the preimage c = T−1(u−p)
5. Sample z← DL (D),−c,σ
6. Output u+Tz
The technical challenge is to find appropriate matrices T and D that lead to an efficient
implementation of all the steps. In particular, we would like T to be a simple matrix (say,
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sparse, triangular, and with small integer entries) so that T has small spectral norm, and both
linear transformations T and T−1 can be computed efficiently. The matrix D (which is uniquely
determined by B and T) should also be sparse and triangular, so that the discrete gaussian
distribution on the cosets ofL (D) can be efficiently sampled. Finally (and this is the trickiest
part in obtaining an efficient instantiation) the complementary covariance matrix Σ2 = r2I−Σ1
should also have a simple Cholesky decoposition Σ2 = LLt where L is triangular, sparse and
with small entries, so that perturbations can be generated efficiently. Ideally, all matrices should
also have a simple, regular structure, so that they do not need to be stored explicitly, and can be
computed on the fly with minimal overhead.
In the next subsection we provide an instantiation that satisfies all of these properties.
Next, in Subsection 3.3.2 we describe the specialized sampling algorithm resulting from the
instantiation, and analyze its correctness and efficiency properties.
3.3.1 Instantiation
In this subsection, we describe a specific choice of linear transformations and matrix
decompositions that satisfies all our desiderata, and results in an efficient instantiation of the
convolution sampling algorithm on G-lattices.
A tempting idea may be to map the lattice basis Bq to the basis Bbk , and then use the
efficient sampling algorithm from Figure 3.1. However, this does not quite work because it
results in a pretty bad transformation T which has both poor geometrical properties and a dense
matrix representation. It turns out that a good choice for a linear transformation T is given
precisely by the matrix T = Bbk describing the basis when q is a power of b. We remark that T
is used as a linear transformation, rather than a lattice basis. So, the fact that it equals Bbk does
not seem to carry any special geometric meaning, it just works! In particular, what we do here
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should not be confused with mapping Bq to Bbk . The resulting factorization is
Bq =

2 q0
−1 2 q1
−1 . . . ...
. . . 2 qk−2
−1 qk−1

=

2
−1 2
−1 . . .
. . . 2
−1 2


1 d0
1 d1
. . . ...
1 dk−2
dk−1

= BbkD
where the entries of the last column of D are defined by the recurrence di = di−1+qib with initial
condition d−1 = 0. Notice that all the di are in the range [0,1), and bi+1 ·di is always an integer.
In some sense, sampling from L (D) is even easier than sampling from L (Bbk) because the
first k− 1 columns of D are orthogonal and the corresponding coordinates can be sampled
independently in parallel. (This should be contrasted with the sequential algorithm in Figure 3.1.)
We now look at the geometry and algorithmic complexity of generating perturbations.
The covariance matrix of T = Bbk is given by
Σ1 = BbkB
t
bk =

b2 −b
−b (b2+1) −b
. . . . . . . . .
−b (b2+1) −b
−b (b2+1)

.
The next step is to find an upper bound r2 on the spectral norm of Σ2, and compute the Cholesky
decomposition LLt of the complementary covariance matrix Σ2 = r2I−Σ1. By the Gershgorin
circle theorem, all eigenvalues of Σ1 are in the range (b± 1)2. So, we may set r = b+ 1.
Numerical computations also suggest that this choice of r is optimal, in the sense that the spectral
norm of Σ1 approaches b+1 as k tends to infinity. The Cholesky decomposition is customarily
defined by taking L to be a lower triangular matrix. However, for sampling purposes, an upper
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triangular L works just as well. It turns out that using an upper triangular L in the decomposition
process leads to a much simpler solution, where all (squared) entries have a simple, closed
form expression, and can be easily computed on-line without requiring any preprocessing
computation or storage. (By contrast, numerical computations suggest that the standard Cholesky
decomposition with lower triangular L is far less regular, and even precomputing it requires
exponentially higher precision arithmetic than our upper triangular solution.) So, we let L be an
upper triangular matrix, and set r = b+1.
For any r, the perturbation’s covariance matrix Σ2 = r2I−Σ1 has Cholesky decomposition
Σ2 = L ·Lt where L is the sparse upper triangular matrix defined by the following equations:
L =

l0 h1
l1 h2
. . . . . .
hk−1
lk−1

where
l20 +h
2
1 = r
2−b2
l2i +h
2
i+1 = r
2− (b2+1) (i = 1, . . . ,k−2)
l2k−1 = r
2− (b2+1)
lihi = b (i = 1, . . . ,k−1)
It can be easily verified that these equations have the following simple closed form solution:
r = b+1, l20 = b
(
1+
1
k
)
+1, l2i = b
(
1+
1
k− i
)
, h2i+1 = b
(
1− 1
k− i
)
(3.1)
We observe that also the inverse transformation B−1bk has a simple, closed-form solution: the ith
column of B−1bk equals (0, · · · ,0, 1b , . . . ,(1b)k−i). Notice that this matrix is not sparse, as it has
O(k2) nonzero entries. However, there is no need to store it and the associated transformation
can still be computed in linear time by solving the sparse triangular system Tx = b by back-
substitution.
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3.3.2 The Algorithm
The sampling algorithm, SAMPLEG, is shown in Figure 3.2. It takes as input a modulus
q, an integer variance s, a coset u of Λ⊥(gt), and outputs a sample statistically close to DΛ⊥u (gt),s.
SAMPLEG relies on subroutines PERTURB and SAMPLED where PERTURB(σ) returns a pertur-
bation, p, statistically close to DL (Σ2),σ ·
√
Σ2 , and SAMPLED(σ ,c) returns a sample z such that
Dz is statistically close to DL (D),−c,σ .
Both PERTURB and SAMPLED are instantiations of the randomized nearest plane algo-
rithm [61, 46]. Consequently, both algorithms rely on a subroutine SAMPLEZt(σ ,c,σmax) which
returns a sample statistically close to one-dimensional discrete gaussian with it a tail-cut t, DtZ,σ ,c
over the fixed support of Z∩ [c− t ·σmax,c+ t ·σmax]. We fix the support of all one dimensional
discrete gaussians for compatibility with ML distance. In addition, we only feed SAMPLEZ
centers c ∈ [0,1) since we can always shift by an integer.
Storage
The scalars ci in SAMPLEG, representing c = B−1bk (u−p), and di in SAMPLED, repre-
senting the last column of D, are rational numbers of the form x/bi for a small integer x and
i ∈ [k]. The numbers li,hi are positive numbers of magnitude less than
√
2b+1.
A naive implementation of the algorithms store floating point numbers ci, di, hi, and li
for a total storage of 4k floating point numbers. However, this can be adapted to constant time
storage since they are determined by simple recurrence relations (ci, di) or simple formulas (hi,
li).
Time Complexity
Assuming constant time sampling for SAMPLEZ and scalar arithmetic, SAMPLEG runs
in time O(k). Now let us consider all operations: there are 6k integer additions/subtractions,
3k+2 integer multiplications, 3(k+1) floating point divisions, 2k floating point multiplications,
and 2k floating point additions. The analysis below shows we can use double precision floating
point numbers for most applications.
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Algorithm 3: SampleG
Input: (s = b ·ω(√logn),u =
[u]kb,q = [q]
k
b
Output: x∼ DΛ⊥u (gt),s.
1 σ := s/(b+1).
2 p← PERTURB(σ ).
3 for i = 0, · · · ,k−1 do
4 ci := (ci−1+ui− pi)/b.
5 z← SAMPLED(σ ,c).
6 for i = 0, · · · ,k−2 do
7 ti :=
b · zi− zi−1+qi · zk−1+ui.
8 tk−1 :=
qk−1 · zk−1− zk−2+uk−1.
9 return t.
Algorithm 4: Perturb
Input: σ
Output: p∼ DL (Σ2),Σ2
1 β := 0.
2 for i = 0, · · · ,k−1 do
3 ci := β/li, and σi := σ/li.
4 zi← bcic+ SAM-
PLEZt(σi,bcie[0,1),s).
5 β :=−zihi.
6 p0 := (2b+1)z0+bz1.
7 for i = 1, · · · ,k−1 do
8 pi := b(zi−1+2zi+ zi+1).
9 return p.
Algorithm 5: SampleD
Input: (σ ,c).
Output: z ∈ Zk : Dz∼ DL (D),−c,σ .
1 zk−1← b−ck−1/dk−1c.
2 zk−1← zk−1+ SAMPLEZt(σ/dk−1,b−ck−1/dk−1e[0,1),s).
3 c := c− zk−1d.
4 for i ∈ {0, · · · ,k−2} do
5 zi← b−cic+ SAMPLEZt(σ ,b−cie[0,1),s).
6 return z.
Figure 3.2. Any scalar with an index out of range is 0, i.e. c−1 = z−1 = zk = 0. SAM-
PLEZt(σ ,c,σmax) is a discrete gaussian over Z exactly or approximately with centers in [0,1)
and a fixed truncated support Z∩ [c− t ·σmax,c+ t ·σmax] (t is the tail-cut parameter). We denote
x−bxc as bxe[0,1).
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Statistical Analysis and Floating Point Precision
We now perform a statistical analysis on SAMPLEG with a perfect one-dimensional
sampler (and no tail-bound), then with a tail-bounded imperfect sampler in terms of ML distance.
This allows us to measure loss in concrete security. We direct the reader to [68, Section 3] for
more details on the ML distance and a complete concrete security analysis.
The following lemma is needed in order to make sense of the “Σ3 condition” in Theorem
3.2.1.
Lemma 3.3.1 Let Σ3 be defined by Σ−13 =
(b+1)2
s2 [Σ
−1
1 +[(b+1)
2I−Σ]−1], then its eigenvalues
are Θ(s2/b). Moreover, if λi is the i−th eigenvalue of Σ1, then the i−th eigenvalue of Σ3 is
(s/[b+1])2 · λi[(b+1)2−λi]
(b+1)2 .
Proof: Let Σ1 =QtDQ be its diagonalization. Then, Σ−11 =Q
tD−1Q and the rest follows
from algebraic manipulations of the individual eigenvalues along with the Gershgorin circle
theorem on Σ1. 
Let Cε,k =
√
log(2k(1+1/ε))/pi . Now we can easily bound s from below. We need
the following three conditions for s: s ≥ (b+1)ηε(D),
√
Σ3 ≥ ηε(Σ2), and s ≥ (b+1)ηε(L).
The middle condition determines s with a lower bound of s≥√2b · (2b+1) ·Cε,k (the last two
conditions both have s =Ω(b1.5 ·Cε,k)).
Corollary 3.3.1 Fix 0 < ε ≤ 1/2 and let s≥√2b · (2b+1) ·Cε,k. Then, SAMPLEG returns a
perturbation within a statistical distanceΘ(kεˆ) from DΛ⊥u (gt),s for any q< b
k when PERTURB and
SAMPLED use a perfect one-dimensional sampler, SAMPLEZ. In addition, the Re´nyi divergence
of order infinity of DΛ⊥u (gt),s from SAMPLEG with a perfect one-dimensional sampler is less than
or equal to 1+Θ(kεˆ).
The statistical distance bound of Θ(kεˆ) results in about a loss of log logq bits in security
if ε = 2−κ for a security parameter κ by [68, Lemma 3.1]. (The multiplicative factor of k comes
from the randomized nearest plane algorithm’s analysis: see [46, Theorem 4.1].)
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Next, we turn to the ML distance for a tighter analysis on the bits of security lost in using
SAMPLEG with an imperfect one-dimensional sampler. Since the centers, c, and variances, s,
given to SAMPLEZ are computed from two or three floating point computations, we assume both
c¯ and s¯ are within a relative error of 2−m of c and s.
Proposition 3.3.1 Fix an ε > 0 and let s≥ (b+1) ·ηε(Z). For any one-dimensional sampler
SAMPLEZt(σ¯ , c¯,s) that takes as inputs approximated centers c¯ ∈ [0,1) and variances σ¯ ∈
[s/(b+1),s ·b/(b+1)] represented as floating point numbers with mantissa length m,
∆ML(SAMPLEGD
t
Z,σ ,c,SAMPLEGSAMPLEZt(σ¯ ,c¯))≤
2k[O(b2t22−m)+max
σ¯ ,c¯
∆ML(SAMPLEZt(σ¯ , c¯,s),DtZ,σ¯ ,c¯)].
Before we begin the proof, we note that dk−1 = q/bk ∈ [1/b,1] since k = dlogb qe.
This implies that every variance fed to SAMPLEZ is in the range [s/(b+ 1),s · b/(b+ 1)] ⊆
[s/(b+1),s]. We restrict all truncated one-dimensional discrete gaussians to Z∩ [c− t ·s,c+ t ·s]
since it is unclear when Z∩ [c− t ·σ ,c+ t ·σ ] = Z∩ [c− t · σ¯ ,c+ t · σ¯ ] when using floating point
variances σ¯ . The ML distance is undefined when these two sets are not equal.
Proof: First, we use the triangle inequality on ML distance in order to pair together terms
for an easier analysis.
∆ML(SAMPLEGD
t
Z,σ ,c ,SAMPLEGSAMPLEZt(σ¯ ,c¯,s))≤
∆ML(SAMPLEGD
t
Z,σ ,c ,SAMPLEGD
t
Z,σ¯ ,c)+∆ML(SAMPLEGD
t
Z,σ¯ ,c,SAMPLEGD
t
Z,σ¯ ,c¯)+
∆ML(SAMPLEGD
t
Z,σ¯ ,c¯ ,SAMPLEGSAMPLEZt(σ¯ ,c¯,s)).
Next, we use the data processing inequality on ML distance where we treat SAMPLEG as
a function of 2k correlated samples from a one-dimensional discrete gaussian sampler. From
[Lemma 3.2, MW17], we get the following inequality:
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∆ML(SAMPLEGD
t
Z,σ ,c ,SAMPLEGSAMPLEZt(σ¯ ,c¯,s))≤
2k ·maxσi,ci[∆ML(DtZ,σ1,c1,DtZ,σ¯1,c1)+∆ML(DtZ,σ¯2,c2,DtZ,σ¯2,c¯2)+
∆ML(DtZ,σ¯3,c¯3,SAMPLEZt(σ¯3, c¯3,s))].
The maximum is taken over all ci ∈ [0,1) and σi ∈ [s/(b+ 1),s · b/(b+ 1)]. Let Zt =
Z∩ [c− t · s,c+ t · s]. We bound maxσ1,c1 ∆ML(DtZ,σ1,c1 ,DtZ,σ¯1,c1) as follows:
max
σ1,c1
∆ML(DtZ,σ1,c1,D
t
Z,σ¯1,c1) = maxσ1,c1,x∈Zt
| lnDtZ,σ1,c1(x)− lnDtZ,σ¯1,c1(x)|
= max
σ1,c1,x∈Zt
∣∣∣∣pi(x− c)2[ 1σ21 − 1σ¯21
]
+ ln
ρσ¯1,c1(Z)
ρσ1,c1(Z)
∣∣∣∣ .
Since σ1, σ¯1 ≥ ηε(Z), we can approximate ρσ1,c(Z) ∈ [(1− ε)2,(1+ ε)2] ·σ and ρσ¯1,c(Z) ∈
[(1−ε)2,(1+ε)2] · σ¯ . Using the bound on the relative error of σ¯1 (σ¯1 ∈ [1−2−m,1+2−m] ·σ1),
we can bound the expression with a simplified form below.
max
σ1,c1
∆ML(DtZ,σ1,c1,D
t
Z,σ¯1,c1)≤
max
σ1
∣∣∣∣pi t2s2σ21 · σ¯
2
1 −σ21
σ21
+2εˆ+ ˆ2−m
∣∣∣∣≤
pit2(b+1)2(2−m+1+2−2m)+ εˆ+ ˆ2−m.
The proof for ∆ML(DtZ,σ¯2,c2,D
t
Z,σ¯2,c¯2) is nearly identical except we get a term linear in t, yielding
a bound of O(t ·2−m). 
Assuming a cryptosystem using a perfect sampler for DΛ⊥u (gt),s has κ bits of security,
we can combine the results of Corollary 3.3.1, Proposition 3.3.1, and [68, Lemma 3.3] to
conclude that swapping DΛ⊥u (gt),s with SAMPLEG yields about κ − 2log(tb2)− 3loglogq− 5
bits of security when m = κ/2, ∆ML(SAMPLEZt(s¯, c¯),DtZ,s¯,c¯) < 2
−κ/2, and ε = 2−κ .
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Figure 3.3. Measured clock cycles with q = {4.1 ·103,1.22 ·105,1.68 ·107,8.38 ·107,
4.30 ·109,9 ·1018} and s = 100 averaged over 100,000 runs. The clock cycles for the last three
moduli are {19.4,31.9,73.9} for GPV and {5.5,7.5, 13.1} for SAMPLEG with pre-computation.
3.3.3 Implementation and Comparison
In this subsection, we compare simple implementations of both SAMPLEG and the
generic randomized nearest plane algorithm [46, Section 4] used in the G-lattice setting. The
implementations were carried out in C++ with double precision floating point numbers for
non-integers on an Intel i7-2600 3.4 GHz CPU. Clock cycles were measured with the “time.h”
library and the results are charted in Figure 2.3.
The one-dimensional sampler, SAMPLEZ, was an instantiation of a discrete version of
Karney’s sampler [59], which is a modified rejection sampler. The moduli q were chosen from
the common parameters subsection of [57, Section 4.2], in addition to an arbitrary 60-bit modulus.
Most practical schemes require no more than a 30-bit modulus [16] for lattice dimension (n)
up to 1024. More advanced schemes however, like ABE-encryption [19, 31], and predicate
encryption [49], require a super-polynomial modulus often 90 or more bits (assuming the circuits
in the ABE and predicate schemes are of log-depth).
For the generic, randomized nearest plane sampler, we pre-computed and stored the
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Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of the basis Bq and we only counted the clock cycles to run the
algorithm thereafter. We had two versions of SAMPLEG: the first was the algorithm as-is, and
the second would store pre-computed perturbations from PERTURB(σ), one for each G-lattice
sample. This version of SAMPLEG with pre-computation saved about a factor of two in clock
cycles.
3.4 Perturbation Sampling in Cyclotomic Rings
The lattice preimage sampling algorithm of [66] requires the generation of n(2+ logq)-
dimensional gaussian perturbation vectors p with covariance Σp = s2 · I−α2T ·Tt where T ∈
Z(2+logq)n×n logq is a matrix with small entries serving as a lattice trapdoor, α is a small constant
factor and s is an upper bound on the spectral norm of αT. In [66] this is accomplished using the
Cholesky factorization of Σp, which takes O(n logq)3 pre-computation and O(n logq)2 storage
and running time.
The trapdoor matrix T of [66] has some additional structure: Tt = [T¯t ,I] for some
T¯ ∈ Z2n×n logq. Moreover, when working with algebraic lattices, T¯ = φn(T˜) is the image (under
a ring embedding φn : Rn→ Zn×n) of some matrix T˜ ∈ R2×logqn with entries in a ring Rn of rank
n. (Most commonly, Rn = O2n = Z[x]/(xn+1) is the ring of integers of the (2n)th cyclotomic
field K2n for n = 2k a power of two.) In [16] it is observed that, using the sparsity of Σp, the
preprocessing storage and on-line computation cost of noise perturbation reduce to O(n2 logq).3
This is a factor logq improvement over a generic implementation, but it is still quadratic in the
main security parameter n. This can be a significant improvement in practice, but the overall
cost of the algorithm remains substantial. When using generic trapdoors T¯ ∈ Z2n×n logq, there
is little hope to improve the running time below O(n2 logq), because just reading the matrix T¯
takes this much time. However, when using algebraic lattices, the trapdoor T¯ = φn(T˜) admits
a compact representation T˜ consisting of only 2n logq integers, so one may hope to reduce the
running time to linear or quasi-linear in n.
3Sparsity also reduces the preprocessing running time to O(logq ·n2+n3) = O(n3), but still cubic in n.
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In this section we give an alternative algorithm to generate integer perturbation vectors p
with covariance Σp when T¯ = φn(T˜). Our algorithm takes full advantage of the ring structure
of Rn, compactly representing Σp and all other matrices generated during the execution of
the algorithm as the image of matrices with entries in the ring Rn. In particular, similarly to
[40, 41], our algorithm has time and space complexity quasi-linear in n, but does not require any
preprocessing/storage. The algorithm can be expressed in a modular way as the combination of
three steps:
1. First, the problem of sampling a O(n logq)-dimensional integer vectors p with covariance
Σp is reduced to the problem of sampling a 2n-dimensional integer vector with covariance
expressed by a 2×2 matrix over Rn.
2. Next, the problem of sampling an integer vector with covariance in R2×2n is reduced to
sampling two n-dimensional integer vectors, each with a covariance expressed by a single
ring element in Rn.
3. Finally, if n> 1, the sampling problem with covariance in Rn is reduced to sampling an
n-dimensional perturbation with covariance expressed by a 2×2 matrix over the smaller
ring Rn/2.
Iterating the last two steps logn times reduces the original problem to sampling in R1 = Z.
Details about each step are given in the next subsections. We remark that the algorithm is
described as a recursive procedure only for simplicity of presentation and analysis, and it can be
implemented just as easily using a simple nested loop, similarly to many FFT-like algorithms.
3.4.1 Discrete Perturbation Algorithm for Power of Two Cyclotomics
In this subsection we present the perturbation algorithm algorithm which produces
n(2+ logq)-dimensional perturbations from a discrete gaussian on Zn(2+logq) in time O˜(n logq).
The entry point of the algorithm is the SAMPLEPZ procedure, which takes as input
two integer parameters n,q, matrices T˜ ∈ R2×logqn , Σ2 ∈ R2×2n , and three positive real numbers
34
s2,α2, z = (α−2− s−2)−1, and is expected to produce an n(2+ logq)-dimensional vector p with
(non-spherical) discrete gaussian distribution DZn(2+logq),
√
Σp of covariance
Σp = s2 · I−α2
φn(T˜)
I
 · [φn(T˜)t I]
=
 Σ2 −α2φn(T˜)
−α2φn(T˜)t (s2−α2)I
 .
The algorithm calls two subroutines:
• SAMPLEZ(s2−α2) which samples a one-dimensional discrete gaussian variable of vari-
ance s2−α2 centered at 0, and can be implemented using any standard technique, and
• SAMPLE2Z(a,b,d), which, on input three ring elements a,b,d compactly describing a
positive definite matrix
Σ2 =
φn(a) φn(b)
φn(b)t φn(d)
 ,
is expected to sample a (2n)-dimensional vector p← DZ2n,√Σ2 .
In turn, SAMPLE2Z (also described in Figure 3.4) makes use of a procedure SAMPLEFZ( f )
which on input a ring element f with positive definite φn( f ), returns a sample p← DZn,√φn( f ).
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Algorithm 6: SamplePz
Input: (n,q,s,α, T˜,Σ2,z).
Output: (p,q)∼ DZn(2+logq),Σp .
1 for i = 0, · · · ,n logq−1 do
2 qi← SAMPLEZ(s2−α2).
3 (c0,c1) :=− α2s2−α2 T˜q.
4 c′(x) := c0(x2)+ x · c1(x2)).
5 p← SAMPLE2Z(a,b,d,c′).
6 return (p,q).
Algorithm 7: Sample2z
Input: (a,b,c,d).
Output: (q0,q1)∼ DZ2n,Σ2 .
1 Let c(x) = c0(x2)+ x · c1(x2).
2 q1← SAMPLEFZ(d,c1).
3 c0 := c0+bd−1(q1− c1).
4 q0←
SAMPLEFZ(a−bd−1b∗,c0).
5 return (q0,q1).
Algorithm 8: SampleFz
Input: ( f ,c).
Output: q∼ DZn,c,φn( f ).
1 if dim( f ) = 1 then
2 return SAMPLEZ( f ,c).
3 else
4 Let f (x) = f0(x2)+ x · f1(x2).
5 (q0,q1)← SAMPLE2Z( f0, f1, f0,c).
6 let q(x) = q0(x2)+ x ·q1(x2).
7 return q.
Figure 3.4. Sampling algorithm SAMPLEPZ for integer perturbations where T = φn(T˜) is a
compact trapdoor over a power of two cyclotomic ring. Note, T˜i is a row vector over Rn for each
i ∈ {0,1}. The scalar z = (α−2− s−2)−1.
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Efficiency
Multiplications are done in the fieldKi, for an element’s dimension i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,2n}, in
time Θ(i log i) by using the Chinese remainder transform (CRT ) [65].
By treating scalar arithmetic as constant time, SAMPLEPZ has a time complexity of
Θ(n logn logq) because the transformation by T˜ is Θ(n logn logq) and SAMPLEFZ has complex-
ityΘ(n log2 n) (represented by the recurrence R(n) = 2R(n/2)+2logn/2+4.5n). The algorithm
requires 2n logq scalar storage for the trapdoor T˜.
Note, SAMPLEFZ is even more efficient, Θ(n logn), if one were to store the polyno-
mials inKi in the canonical embedding (Fourier domain). One would change SAMPLEPZ to
give SAMPLE2Z the Fourier/canonical representations of a,b,d,c0,c1 and perform an inverse
CRT/FFT on p = (p0,p1). This allows us to use the FFT’s butterfly transformation to convert
to the Fourier representation of f (x) = f0(x2)+ x f1(x2) ∈K2n to the Fourier representation of
f0, f1 ∈Kn and multiplication/inversion is now linear time (we would only invert the non-zero
entries in the Fourier domain since this corresponds to pulling back to the field, inverting, then
pushing forward to the cyclic ring via the embedding given by the Chinese remainder theorem)
[41, Lemma 1]. (Moving from the canonical embedding to the FFT domain is linear time since
we place zeros for the non-primitive roots of unity [41, Section A.2].) This, however, does
not change the asymptotic time complexity of SAMPLEPZ since generating q in the canonical
embedding is now Θ(n logn logq).
Correctness
One would use Peikert’s convolution theorem, Theorem 3.2.1, in an initial attempt to
prove the correctness of the algorithms in Figure 3.4. However, this would only ensure the
correctness of the marginal distributions of p in SAMPLEPZ and q0 in SAMPLE2Z and not
their respective joint distributions, (p,q) and (q0,q1). Even if it were enough, tracking the Σ3
condition in Theorem 3.2.1 through the recursive calls of the algorithms above is tedious. Instead,
we derive a convolution lemma without a Σ3 condition for the joint distribution of our discrete
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gaussian convolutions on the simple lattice Zn.
First, we show the gaussian function ρ√Σ(·) factors in a useful manner with respect to a
Schur complement decomposition.
Lemma 3.4.1 Let Σ=
A B
Bt D
 0 be a positive definite with A ∈ Rn×n and D ∈ Rm×m and
Σ/D = A−BD−1Bt is D’s Schur complement, and let x1 ∈ Rn and x2 ∈ Rm be arbitrary.
Then, the gaussian function ρ√Σ(x) factors as ρ√Σ/D(x1−BD−1x2) ·ρ√D(x2) = ρ√Σ(x) where
x = (x1,x2) ∈ Rn+m.
Proof:(Sketch) This is seen through defining the inverse of Σ in terms of Σ/D and writing
out ρ√Σ(x) in terms of Σ/D. The matrix factorization
Σ=
I BD−1
0 I

Σ/D 0
0 D

 I 0
D−1Bt I

yields the formula for Σ−1 needed to show the result. 
A consequence of the above lemma is that the gaussian sum ρ√Σ(Z
n+m) expands in terms
of the gaussian functions ρ√D(·) and ρ√Σ/D(·),
ρ√Σ(Z
n+m) = ∑
y2∈Zm
ρ√D(y2) ·ρ√Σ/D(Zn−BD−1y2).
We will use the following lemma for the correctness proof. It states that if a discrete
gaussian on the integer lattice is wide enough in its slimmest direction, then the lower dimensional
discrete gaussians with covariance shaped with principal submatrices of the original are wide
enough on their respective Zn′s.
Lemma 3.4.2 Let ε > 0, Σ  0 be a positive definite matrix in Rn×n, and let I0 ⊂ [n] be an
arbitrary, non-empty subset. If Σ η2ε (Zn), then Σ[I0] η2ε (Z|I0|) and Σ/I¯0  η2ε (Zn−|I0|) for
any principal submatrix - Schur complement pair, (Σ[I0],Σ/I¯0), of Σ.
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Proof: Note, a consequence of Σ η2ε (Zn) is that Σ’s minimum eigenvalue, λmin(Σ), is greater
than η2ε (Zn). Let M := Σ[I0] ∈Rn0×n0 for n0 = |I0|. M is diagonalizable so let M=QtΛQ be its
diagonalization. Notice, we have the following inequality from the interlacing theorems which
imply λmin(M)≥ λmin(Σ),
xtMx = xtQtΛQx = ytΛy = ∑
i∈[n0]
λiy2i ≥ λmin(Σ)‖y‖2 = λmin(Σ)‖x‖2.
Next, we can bound the quantity ρ√M−1((Z
n0)∗) = ρ√M−1(Z
n0) by 1+ ε:
ρ√M−1(Z
n0) = ∑
x∈Zn0
e−pix
tMx ≤ ∑
x∈Zn0
e−piλmin(Σ)‖x‖
2
≤ ∑
x∈Zn
e−piλmin(Σ)‖x‖
2 ≤ 1+ ε.
The jump from Zn0 to Zn comes from the relation Zn0 ⊂Zn. The proof for the Schur complement
is identical. 
Next, we state and prove our main convolution lemma.
Lemma 3.4.3 For any real 0< ε ≤ 1/2, positive integers n,m, vector c = (c1,c2) ∈ Rn+m, and
positive definite matrix Σ=
A B
Bt D
 η2ε (Zn+m), A∈Zn×n, B∈Zn×m, and D∈Zm×m (where
Σ/D = A−BD−1Bt is the Schur complement of D) the random process
• x2← DZm,√D,c2 .
• x1← DZn,√Σ/D,c1+BD−1(x2−c2).
produces a vector x = (x1,x2) ∈ Zn+m such that the Re´nyi divergence of order infinity of
DZn+m,
√
Σ,c from x is less than or equal to 1+4ε .
Proof:
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First, we write out the probability and use Lemma 3.4.1 to simplify the numerator. Let
x′ = (x′1,x′2) below.
Pr[x1 = x′1,x2 = x′2] =
ρ√Σ/D(x′1− c1−BD−1(x′2− c2)) ·ρ√D(x′2− c2)
ρ√Σ/D(Zn− c1−BD−1(x′2− c2)) ·ρ√D(Zm− c2)
=
ρ√Σ(x
′− c)
ρ√Σ/D(Zn− c1−BD−1(x′2− c2)) ·ρ√D(Zm− c2)
Regarding the denominator, we use Lemma 3.4.2 to see that Σ/D η2ε (Zn) since Σ
η2ε (Zn+m). Now, we can use Lemma 3.2.3 for the first gaussian sum (dependent on x′2) in the
denominator to see,
Pr[x1 = x′1,x2 = x′2] ∈ α ·DZn+m,√Σ,c(x′) ·
[(
1− ε
1+ ε
)
,1
]−1
where α =
ρ√Σ(Z
n+m−c)
ρ√Σ/D(Zn)·ρ√D(Zm−c2)
.
Next, we show α ≈ 1. Using Lemma 3.4.1 we expand
ρ√Σ(Z
n+m− c) = ∑
y2∈Zm
ρ√D(y2− c2) ·ρ√Σ/D(Zn− c1−BD−1(y2− c2)).
The sum ρ√Σ/D(Zn−c1−BD−1(y2−c2)) is approximately ρ√Σ/D(Zn) because Σ/D
η2ε (Zn) as a consequence of Lemma 3.4.2 and Σ η2ε (Zn+m). In other words,
ρ√Σ/D(Zn− c1−BD−1(y2− c2)) ∈
[
1− ε
1+ ε
,1
]
·ρ√Σ/D(Zn)
and α ∈ [(1−ε1+ε ) ,1].
Finally, we have the approximation
Pr[x1 = x′1,x2 = x′2] ∈
[(
1− ε
1+ ε
)
,
(
1+ ε
1− ε
)]
·DZn+m,√Σ,c(x′).
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Given the restriction on ε ∈ (0,1/2], we have the relation we desire
Pr[x1 = x′1,x2 = x′2] ∈ [1−4ε,1+4ε] ·DZn+m,√Σ,c(x′).

Next, we bound the Re´nyi divergence of order infinity between the output of SAMPLEPZ
and the desired distribution. We need to ensure each discrete gaussian convolution in the
algorithm is non-degenerate. We do not analyze the statistical loss from the floating point
computations. As shown in Lemma 3.4.3, we need Σ/D η2ε (Zn0) and D η2ε (Zn1) at each of
the n discrete gaussian convolutions. This is met through a simple condition on Σp as hinted to
in Lemma 3.4.2.
Theorem 3.4.1 Let 0< ε ≤ 1/2. If Σp  η2ε (Zn(2+logq)), then SAMPLEPZ returns a perturba-
tion with a Re´nyi divergence of order infinity R∞(DZn(2+logq),
√
Σp||SAMPLEPZ)≤ 1+12nεˆ.
Proof: Since each covariance given to SAMPLEFZ is a Schur complement or a principal
submatrix of a Schur complement of Σp, Lemma 3.4.2 and the interlacing theorems (Theo-
rem 2.1.1 and Theorem2.1.2) imply the conditions for Lemma 3.4.3 are met. As there are
n− 1 convolutions (inner nodes of a full binary tree of depth logn), a quick induction argu-
ment shows the probability distribution of the output of SAMPLEPZ is in the interval [(1−
4ε)3(n−1),(1+4ε)3(n−1)] ·DZn(2+logq),√Σp(x). Then, we have R∞(DZn(2+logq),√Σp||SAMPLEPZ)≤
(1+4ε)3(n−1) ≈ 1+12nεˆ. 
For common parameters ε = 2−128 and n = 1024, we have 1− (1+4ε)3(n−1) ≈ 2−114.
In summary, this shows the FFT-like recurrence in perturbation sampling the integer
lattice with an algebraic covariance in power of two cyclotomic rings through repeated convolu-
tions. The relative simplicity of the power of two case relies on the fact that matrix transpose
corresponds to the conjugation field automorphism. Hermitian transpose corresponds to the
conjugation automorphism in the general cyclotomic case. Therefore, we would use the canonical
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embedding for efficient perturbation sampling in general cyclotomic rings, which we shown in
the next subsction.
Storage and Efficiency
Recent results suggest double precision floating point numbers are enough to preserve
security in lattice-based cryptosystems for commonly used parameters [74, 14], but one can use
the lazy floating point techniques of [40] for SAMPLEZ and still yield a version of SAMPLEPZ
that has quasi-linear time complexity on average if longer floating point precision is needed.
This would involve tweaking SAMPLEFZ and SAMPLE2Z to record their path through the tree
of recursions and pass the path to SAMPLEZ. Then, SAMPLEZ could re-compute its center and
variance in high precision with access to previous samples and the trapdoor T˜.
SAMPLEFZ runs in time O˜(n), and SAMPLEPZ runs in time O˜(n logq) as a result. Storage
consists of storing the trapdoor T˜ which is 2n logq small integers (less than q, O(logn) bits each),
and the algorithm stores 4n floating point numbers for the input of SAMPLE2Z.
3.4.2 General Cyclotomic Rings
Here we sketch sampling methods for arbitrary cyclotomics. Both the techniques in the
previous subsection and the techniques of [40, 72] apply to this setting as well. Let n = ϕ(n′),
q be a positive integer, On′ = Z[x]/(Φn′(x)) be the n′-th cyclotomic ring withKn′ as the n′-th
cyclotomic field over Q, and let T˜ ∈ O2×logqn′ be a ring trapdoor matrix. Note, the ring On′ is
a lattice in the canonical embedding. Let rad(n′) be the product of all distinct prime divisors
of n′. Define the diagonal matrix of a field element, f ∈Kn′ , as Ψ( f )i,i = f (ζ i) where ζ is a
complex primitive n′-th root of unity and each i is a distinct element in the group of units modulo
n′, i ∈ Z∗n′ . This is the multiplication matrix of an element in the canonical embedding. Notice,
Ψ( f )† =Ψ( f ∗) since conjugation is an automorphism of all cyclotomic fields over Q. We apply
Ψ(·) element-wise to vectors and matrices overKn′ .
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Now, our goal is to efficiently sample the lattice D
O2+logq
n′ ,
√
Σp
where
Σp = s2I−α2
Ψ(T˜)
I
[Ψ(T˜)† I]
and Ψ(T˜)† is the Hermitian transpose of Ψ(T˜). Notice, the Hermitian transpose of an element’s
diagonal matrix results in the diagonal matrix of a different field element since complex conjuga-
tion is an automorphism ofKn′ . Sampling DO2+logq
n′ ,
√
Σp
reduces to sampling discrete gaussians
over Z in nearly the same steps as the previous subsection with z = (α−2− s−2)−1:
1. Sampling p← D
O2+logq
n′ ,
√
Σp
reduces to sampling D
O2
n′ ,
√
Σ2×2
where
Σ2×2 = s2I− z ·Ψ(T˜)Ψ(T˜)† =
Ψ(a) Ψ(b)
Ψ(b∗) Ψ(d)

by first sampling p2← DO logq
n′ ,
√
s2−α2 , updating the randomized center c :=
−α2
s2−α2Ψ(T˜)p2,
then sampling p1← DO2
n′ ,c,
√
Σ2×2
.
2. Sampling D
O2
n′ ,c,
√
Σ2×2
reduces to sampling D
On′ ,
√
Ψ( f ) for a positive definite field element
f by sampling q2← DOn′ ,c2,
√
Ψ(d), then by updating the center c1 := c1+Ψ(bd
−1)(q2−
c2) and sampling q2← DOn′ ,c2,
√
Ψ(a−bd−1b∗).
Similar to how SAMPLEPZ must sample DZn logq,
√
s2−α2 , the first step above requires sampling the
discrete gaussian D
O logq
n′ ,
√
s2−α2 . This can be done in O(rad(n
′)n′ logq) since spherical discrete
gaussians over the ring On′ can be sampled in time O(rad(n′)n′) [65].
By using the randomized nearest plane algorithm to sample discrete gaussians on On′
with diagonal covariances, sampling p statistically close to D
O2+logq
n′ ,
√
Σp
is O(rad(n′)n′ logq)+
O˜(n logq). Note, the randomized rounder of [40, 72] could be used to sample D
On′ ,
√
Ψ( f ). We
conclude on observing that the above holds for any number field which has complex conjugation
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as an automorphism, though might not be as efficient because the ring/lattice of interest may
have no sparse basis in the canonical embedding.
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Chapter 4
The Lattice Gadget Toolkit
4.1 Introduction
The second chapter builds on the first chapter by optimizing all algorithmic tasks on
power-of-b gadgets, as well as introducing an efficient class of gadgets geared towards the
Chinese Remainder Transformation/Representation (CRT) of Zq when q= q1q2 · · ·ql for coprime
qi. These CRT gadgets are used in many advanced lattice-based cryptosystems where the modulus
q is often much larger than the native 64 bits in most modern hardware. In other words, we can
pick each coprime factor qi as an integer just less than 64 bits and utilize the CRT isomorphism
Zq ∼= Zq1×Zq2×·· ·×Zql .
Gadgets
Gadgets in lattice-based cryptography are defined with the following two functions in-
mind. Both functions are parameterized by a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq for m≥ n logq. The first is the
short-integer-solutions (SIS) [4] one-way function: fA(x) := Ax mod q where x is an integer
vector with l2 norm less than some parameter β . We usually set β so the function has collisions
(β =
√
m for x ∈ {0,±1}m). And, we denote SIS “inversion” as x← A−1(u) where u ∈ Znq is
given as an input and x is any short integer vector satisfying Ax mod q = u mod q. Note that
A−1(·) is not a matrix, nor is it a proper function inversion, but it can be randomized. In fact, the
gaussian sampling algorithm in the previous chapter is a discrete gaussian SIS inversion on a
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fixed matrix G ∈ Zn×mq . Next, we define the LWE function [75] as gA(s,e) := stA+ et mod q
where s ∈ Znq and e ∈ Zm has small entries. We will only care about parameter regimes where
the LWE function is invertible (injective).
Loosely, a gadget G∈Zn×mq is any matrix such that the SIS and LWE functions are easy to
invert. The most commonly used gadgets are of the form G := In⊗gt where gt = (1,b, · · · ,bk−1)
and k = dlogb(q)e. The case b = 2 corresponds to a bit decomposition for a deterministic SIS
inversion, g−1(u) := x ∈ {0,1}k such that gtx mod q = u.
These gadgets first appeared in lattice-based trapdoors [4, 12] as well as second gener-
ation FHE schemes [28] in the form of a bit-decomposition. Micciancio and Peikert gave an
optimized lattice trapdoor scheme in [66] which reduces inverting the SIS and LWE functions
on a (pseudo)random A to inverting them on a fixed gadget G. Further, they were the first
to rigorously analyze the gadget lattice, or “G-lattice,” Λ⊥q (G) := {x ∈ Znk : Gx = 0 mod q}.
Alperin-Sheriff and Peikert [10] realized the potential for a simple, randomized bit-decomposition
as G−1(·). Note, here we are thinking of a much simpler subgaussian distribution than a discrete
gaussian preferably avoiding the use of floating point numbers (only achieved when q = bk in
[10]). Alperin-Sheriff and Peikert use subgaussian analysis [79] in order to rigorously analyze
these randomized bit-decompositions.
Recently there has been an effort to introduce gadgets more compatible with the CRT
representation of Zq [53, 22]. Traditional power-of-b gadgets require one to convert to the large
modulus Zq before computing G−1(·). The use of the large modulus here requires multi-precision
numbers, nullifying the benefits of the CRT representation. Let us denote these CRT-compatible
gadgets as gtCRT or GCRT . The gadgets presented in [53, 22] were only applicable in the
specific setting where our modulus q has small prime factors, also known as a smooth modulus.
Restricting to smooth moduli is undesirable since implementations often use a modulus where
each coprime factor is a prime around 64 bits. Moduli with this form allow the use of the “double-
CRT” representation [45]. Of particular interest is performing a discrete gaussian or subgaussian
g−1CRT (·) efficiently with only ever having to represent numbers in the CRT representation.
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Contribution
Fix an integer n > 0 as our security parameter, an integer modulus q > 0, an integer
base 0< b≤√q. Note that we can have b = q, but then our power-of-b gadget will be trivial
g = (1),G = In.
This chapter achieves the following on a power-of-b gadget G for any modulus q:
• compute a subgaussian g−1(·) with minimal distribution width, minimal randomness, and
in linear time and space O(k),
• decode the LWE function on gt in linear time O(k) while maximizing the error tolerance
‖e‖∞.
Previously, these tasks were only optimized when q = bk [66, 10].
Further, this chapter introduces a general set of CRT gadgets for a wide class of moduli
q = q1q2 · · ·ql that achieves the following:
• discrete gaussian and subgaussian inversion can be performed in linear time and in-parallel
with a distribution width independent of modulus’ factors all while keeping arithmetic in
the CRT representation,
• and perform LWE decoding in linear time in-parallel while keeping arithmetic in the CRT
representation.
Mathematically, this efficiency is due to the structure of the CRT gadget’s G-lattice:
Λ⊥q (g
t
CRT ) = Λ
⊥
q (g
t
1)⊕Λ⊥q (gt2)⊕·· ·⊕Λ⊥q (gtl)
where each gti is a power-of-bi gadget chosen by the user with the requirement bi < qi. Therefore,
we can choose each bi = 2 in order to have a narrow distribution on the (CRT) G-lattice.
We note that this set of gadgets directly generalizes [22] since their gadgets correspond
to bi = qi, or gti = (1), and they generalize the gadgets of [53] in spirit
1.
1The CRT gadgets of [53] correspond to a different isomorphism on Zq. The isomorphism in [53] is called the
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Technical details
Our linear time and space subgaussian bit decomposition algorithm for power-of-b
gadgets gt follows the same algorithmic blueprint as our efficient discrete gaussian sampling
algorithm from the previous chapter. That is, we use the G-lattice’s sparse, triangular basis
factorization
Bq = BD
where Bq is a basis of the G-lattice Λ⊥q (g) =L (Bq) and B,D are sparse, triangular matrices.
Now our algorithm is analogous to the previous chapter’s solution:
1. sample a subgaussian distribution on the lattice generated onL (D),
2. and use B as a linear transformation.
The first step is done by performing a “bent-coin” randomized version of Babai’s nearest plane
algorithm [13]. We can sample a narrow distribution onL (D) since D has small entries. With
a careful use of arithmetic in this “bent-coin” nearest plane algorithm, we have an algorithm
which avoids floating point numbers, samples a subgaussian distribution exactly, has a trade-off
between randomness consumed and distribution width (more randomness needed for a tighter
distribution), and uses O(k) time and space.
Our linear time and space LWE decoding algorithm is merely an exercise in lattice duality.
The LWE decoding problem on gt can be seen as the problem of decoding on the lattice
Λq(gt) = {x ∈ Zk : ∃s ∈ Zq s.t. x = sgt mod q}= Zgt +qZk.
This lattice is a scaled version of the G-lattice’s dual
Λq(gt) = qΛ⊥q (g
t)∗
invariant factor decomposition.
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since for any A ∈ Zn×mq we have Λq(A) = qΛ⊥q (A)∗ (whereL ∗ denotes the dual lattice ofL ).
Therefore, the sparse basis factorization of our favorite basis for Λ⊥q (gt)
Bq = BD
yields a triangular factorization for the dual
Λq(gt) =L (qB−tq ),B
−t
q = B
−tD−t .
Luckily, the simple structure of D yields an efficient Babai’s nearest plane decoding toL (qD−t).
Now the algorithmic blueprint should be clear:
1. given y = sgt + et apply Bt as a linear transformation,
2. then decode Bty to qL (D−t) in linear time.
The linear transformation B slightly increases the noise’s entry size, but this is overall a small
price to pay. The result is a linear time and space power-of-b gadget decoding algorithm with
error tolerance ‖e‖∞ ≤ q2(b+1) .
Our family of CRT gadgets employ a simple algebraic trick: delegate the inverse CRT
transformation to the gadget. The CRT isomorphism ϕ : Zq → Zq1 ×Zq2 × ·· · ×Zql has a
simple form, ϕ(x) = (x mod q1, · · · ,x mod ql), but its inverse is a little more complicated. In
particular, it is of the form ϕ−1(x1, · · · ,xl) = ϕ−1(x) = 〈α,x〉 where α = (α1, · · · ,αl) is a vector
of integers with entries dependent on q’s factorization. Now, the CRT gadget is of the form
gtCRT = (α1g
t
1, · · ·αlgtl).
A few algebraic manipulations reveal an ideal G-lattice structure:
Λ⊥q (g
t
CRT ) = Λ
⊥
q (g
t
1)⊕Λ⊥q (gt2)⊕·· ·⊕Λ⊥q (gtl).
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4.2 Background
We indicate numbers with lowercase letters, such as z ∈ Z, vectors as bold lowercase
letters, z ∈ Zn, and matrices as uppercase bold letters, M ∈ Rn×n. The default norm used is
the l2 norm of a vector unless stated otherwise, though we will often use the max, or l∞, norm.
For a real number r, denote drc as the deterministic rounding function to a nearest integer
of r. Rounding a real vector is applied analogously, entry-wise. Many computations will be
done over the integers modulo q, Zq. We view Zq through its balanced coset representatives in
(−q/2,q/2] unless stated otherwise. For a positive integer base b and a non-negative integer
u< bk, u’s b-ary decomposition is a vector [u]kb = (u0, · · · ,uk−1) ∈ {0, · · · ,b−1}k and satisfies
∑i biui = u. When b = 2, this is simply u’s binary decomposition. Recall the Chinese Remainder
Theorem for modular arithmetic. Let q be a positive integer with a prime factorization of
q = pe11 · · · pell = q1 · · ·ql . Then by the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), we have Zq ∼=
Zq1 ×·· ·×Zql . The isomorphism φ(·) is given by φ(a) = (a mod q1, · · · ,a mod ql) and its
inverse is φ−1(a1, · · · ,al) = ∑i(ai)q∗i qˆi where q∗i := qqi and qˆi := (q∗i )−1 mod qi.
For a probability distribution χ , we denote e← χ to mean e is sampled from χ . When χ
is trivial (often over a number x), we will use e← x to be variable assignment as well.
4.2.1 Subgaussian Random Variables
A random variable X over R is subgaussian [65, 79] with parameter α > 0 if its (scaled)
moment generating function satisfies E[exp(2pitX)] ≤ exp(piα2t2) for all t ∈ R. Scaling a
subgaussian X by any c ∈R to c ·X yields a subgaussian random variable with parameter |c|α . If
X is subgaussian with parameter α , then its tails are dominated by a Gaussian parameterized by
α , Pr{|X | ≥ t} ≤ 2exp(−pit2/α2). Any B-bounded centered (E[X ] = 0) random variable X is
subgaussian with parameter B
√
2pi . When X is subgaussian with parameter α and Y conditioned
on X taking any value is subgaussian with parameter β , X +Y is subgaussian with parameter√
α2+β 2. This property is called Pythagorean additivity. The proof of the following Lemma is
50
derived by expanding E[exp(2pit(X +Y ))].
Lemma 4.2.1 Let X ,Y be discrete random variables over R such that X is subgaussian with
parameter α and Y conditioned on X taking any value is subgaussian with parameter β . Then,
X +Y is subgaussian with parameter
√
α2+β 2.
Proof: Expanding the moment generating function gives the result:
E[exp(2pit(X +Y ))] =∑
z
∑
χ
Pr{Y = z−χ|X = χ}Pr{X = χ}exp(2pitz)
=∑
χ
Pr{X = χ}exp(2pitχ)E[exp(2pitY )|X = χ]
≤ exp(pit2(α2+β 2)).

A random vector x over Rn is subgaussian with parameter α > 0 if 〈x,u〉 is subgaussian
with parameter α for all unit vectors u. Using a similar calculation to the above, one can show
that if each coefficient of a random vector is subgaussian with parameter α conditioned on the
previous coefficients taking any values, then the vector is subgaussian with parameter α . The
slightly more general fact below is needed for our algorithms. Its proof is analogous to the proof
of Lemma 4.2.1.
Lemma 4.2.2 Let x be a discrete random vector over Rn such that each coordinate xi is subgaus-
sian with parameter αi given the previous coordinates take any values. Then, x is a subgaussian
vector with parameter maxi{αi}.
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Proof: As before, we expand the moment generating function:
E[exp(2pit 〈x,u〉)] =∑
χ
Pr{x = (χ1, · · · ,χn)}exp(2pit 〈χ,u〉)
≤ exp(pit2∑
i
α2i u
2
i )
≤ exp(pit2 max
i
αi2‖u‖2).
The jump to the inequalities skips the straightforward calculations (nearly the same calculations
as in Lemma 4.2.1). 
We emphasize this fact, for without it one is left with an unnecessary
√
n term in the
subgaussian parameter of subgaussian vectors. Now, that the sum of independently generated
random vectors x and y subgaussian with parameters α and β is a subgaussian vector with
parameter
√
α2+β 2 immediately follows.
A main algorithm presented in this chapter will rely on a linear transformation of a
discrete subgaussian vector.
Lemma 4.2.3 (Simplified [65, Corollary 2.3]) Let x be a subgaussian random vector with pa-
rameter α and let M be a linear transformation. Then, Mx is a subgaussian vector with
parameter αλmax(MMt)1/2 where λmax(·) is the largest eigenvalue.
4.2.2 q-ary Lattices
Throughout this chapter we will mostly be concerned with q-ary lattices. These are full-
rank integer lattices with q ·Zk as a sublattice. Fix an integer q> 0 to be used as a modulus and
let m> w> n. A matrix A ∈ Zn×mq is primitive if AZmq = Znq. Given an A ∈ Zn×mq , we define the
following lattices: Λ⊥q (A) = {z ∈ Zm : Az = 0 mod q}, and Λq(A) = {v ∈ Zm : ∃ s ∈ Zn, vt =
stA mod q}. These lattices satisfy the following duality relation: Λ⊥q (A)∗ = q ·Λq(A). Further,
the cosets of Λ⊥q (A), Λ⊥u (A) := {z ∈ Zm : Az = u mod q}, are in bijection with Znq when A is
primitive. Let G be an arbitrary, primitive matrix over Zq. The following sampling problem,
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defined on the integer cosets of Λ⊥q (G), is needed for many advanced lattice crypto-schemes.
Definition 4.2.1 For a primitive G ∈ Zn×wq , the subgaussian decomposition problem with pa-
rameter α for G is to sample vectors x ∈ Zw subgaussian with parameter α such that u = Gx
mod q for arbitrary u given as input.
Another name for this problem is subgaussian sampling. A generic adaptation of Babai’s
algorithm (analyzed in Section 4.4, called the subgaussian nearest plane algorithm) is used in
[10] (AP14) to achieve subgaussian decomposition for a specific G. In general, this generic
algorithm runs in time O(k2), and uses space O(k3). Another, related problem is the discrete
Gaussian sampling problem.
Definition 4.2.2 For a primitive G ∈ Zn×wq , the discrete Gaussian sampling problem with width
s for G is to sample vectors x ∈ Zw distributed as DZw,s conditioned on Gx mod q = u for
arbitrary u given as input.
Efficient solutions with small s for commonly used G’s are given in [66, 42]. Both of the
above sampling problems have polynomial time solutions using randomized versions of Babai’s
algorithm. In addition, we will consider decoding the q-ary code defined by G for an arbitrary,
primitive G.
Definition 4.2.3 For a primitive G ∈ Zn×wq , the LWE decoding problem with tolerance δ on G
is to return s given stG+ et mod q for an error ‖e‖∞ < δ .
Specifically, we want to efficiently decode G while maximizing δ ∈ [0,q/2). An efficient
LWE decoding algorithm for a specific, commonly used G (b = 2 in the paragraph below) with
tolerance q/4 is provided in [66].
A G commonly used in lattice-based schemes is defined as follows. Fix an integer
b ∈ (1,q), known as the base, and let k = dlogb qe. The block-diagonal gadget matrix is
G = In⊗gt with blocks gt := (1,b, · · · ,bk−1). A common basis for Λ⊥q (gt) [42] Sq has a sparse,
triangular factorization Sq = SD [42] (restated in Section 4.5.2 in this chapter).
53
4.3 Gadget Matrices
In order to guide our search for gadget matrices with efficient inversion and sampling
algorithms, we give a simple general definition of gadget. The definition is modeled after
the properties required by the digit decomposition problem, perhaps the simplest and most
natural application of gadgets. But, as we will see, this simple characterization is enough to
guarantee (theoretical) solutions to all problems that arise in the application of gadgets in lattice
cryptography.
Definition 4.3.1 For any finite additive group A, an A-gadget of size w and quality β is a vector
g ∈ Aw such that any group element u ∈ A can be written as an integer combination u = ∑i gi · xi
where x = (x1, . . . ,xw) has norm at most ‖x‖ ≤ β .
We are primarily interested in gadgets for A=Znq, in which case the gadget is conveniently
represented as a matrix G ∈ Zn×wq such that for any u ∈ Znq there is a vector x ∈ Zw of length
‖x‖≤ β such that Gx= u (mod q). We defined gadgets in terms of abstract groups to emphasize
that the dimension n and modulus q should be thought of as part of the problem specification
(typically mandated by the target application), while the w and β describe the size and quality of
the solution. In particular, for any given n and q, one may consider multiple gadgets achieving
different values of w and β . Naturally, smaller w and β are preferable, but as we will see there is
a natural tradeoff between these two values, and one may increase β in order to reduce w and
vice versa.
Before establishing a formal connection between the above definition and the notion of
gadget informally defined in previous work, we make some important observations.
• The matrix G is necessarily primitive, i.e., GZwq = Znq. Moreover, any primitive matrix is a
Znq-gadget for a sufficiently large β = maxu min{‖x‖ : Gx = u (mod q)}.
• If g∈Zk is a Zq-gadget of quality β , then G= I⊗gt ∈Zn×wq is a Znq-gadget of size w= kn
and quality
√
nβ .
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• All definitions and constructions are easily adapted to ideal lattices (as used in the Ring-
SIS and Ring-LWE problems) simply by considering “structured gadgets” of the form
G⊗ [α1, . . . ,αn] where [α1, . . . ,αn] is an appropriate Z-basis of the underlying ring.
Based on the above observations, constructions may focus on the case n = 1, i.e., gadget
vectors g ∈ Zwq , and then extend the solution to larger n (and possibly to the ring setting) using
general techniques. In fact, this is how larger gadgets are built in all applications we are aware
of. However, all the results in this section hold for arbitrary matrices, not necessarily with this
tensor structure. So, for the sake of generality, we use matrix notation.
In order to justify our abstract definition of gadget, we show that it guarantees all other
properties of gadgets used by lattice cryptography: it maps the gaussian distribution to an almost
uniform vector GDwZ,s ≈ Znq (as needed by the trapdoor generation algorithm of [66]), and it
supports efficient algorithms to invert the LWE function gG(x,e), for discrete gaussian sampling
on f−1G (u), and for subgassian decomposition with respect to G. All these properties are proved
by bounding the relevant parameters of the lattice Λ⊥q (G) defined by G.
Theorem 4.3.1 For any gadget matrix G∈Zn×wq of quality β , the lattice L=Λ⊥q (G) has a basis
S with orthogonalized length ‖S˜‖ ≤ 2β +√w, successive minima λ1(L), . . . ,λw(L)≤ 2β +
√
w
and smoothing parameter η(L)≤ (2β +√w)ω(√logn).
Proof: We first bound the covering radius µ(L). Let x ∈ Rw be arbitrary, and let y = bxe
be a nearest point in Zw to x. There exists some integer vector z of norm at most β such that
Gz=−Gy mod q. Therefore, the vector y+z is in Λ⊥q (G) and is at distance at most β +
√
w/2
from x by two applications of the triangle inequality.
The other bounds immediately follow from general relations (satisfied by any lattice)
λw(L)≤ 2µ(L) and η(L)≤ λn(L)ω(
√
logn). Finally, any lattice has a basis with orthogonalized
length ‖S˜‖ ≤ λw(L). 
Note, the proof and theorem easily generalizes to any finite abelian group. Using
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the bound on the smoothing parameter, and the short (orthogonalized) basis S ∈ Zw×w, we
immediately get the following applications.
Corollary 4.3.1 For any gadget matrix G ∈ Zn×wq of quality β and s≥ (2β +
√
w)
√
ω(logn),
the distribution GDwZ,s is statistically close to the uniform distribution over Z
n
q. Moreover, there
are polynomial-time algorithms for the following problems:
• Discrete Gaussian Sampling for the function fG(x) = Gx (mod q) and input distribution
DwZ,s with s≥ (2β +
√
w)
√
ω(logn).
• Subgaussian Decomposition w.r.t G with parameter s≥ (2β +√w) ·√2pi .
• LWE decoding of gG(s,e) for any s ∈ Znq and ‖e‖∞ ≤ q/2 · (2β +
√
w).
We remark that the general solutions provided by this corollary are of theoretical interest,
and not suitable for practice. They are provided here only as a general feasibility result, in order
to identify classes of good gadget matrices. The rest of the paper is dedicated to showing that by
carefully choosing the gadget vector g, one can obtain constructions and algorithms that are not
only theoretically efficient, but also easy to implement and extremely fast.
4.4 Subgaussian Nearest Plane
Now we describe the subgaussian nearest plane algorithm, SGNP(B, t), used in throughout
this chapter. It is a randomized version of Babai’s algorithm (Theorem 2.2.1), and it was first
used in a theoretical sense by Alperin-Sheriff and Peikert [10]. The algorithm takes as input a
target t ∈ Rn, a lattice basis B, and its GSO. It returns a lattice point x that is randomly chosen
so that x− t is a subgaussian vector. The subgaussian parameter, as we will see, is maxi ‖b˜i‖.
Let B∗k be the GSO of the basis Bk. As in the nearest plane algorithm, we partition the
latticeL (Bk) into parallel planesL (Bk) =
⋃
i∈Z(L (Bk−1)+ i ·bk), but here we randomly round
to the plane j or j−1, the planes between which the target lies, with a probability which depends
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on the target’s distance from the nearest plane instead of directly rounding. In more detail, given
an input vector t, we perform the following: First project the target orthogonally onto the span of
b∗k and store the coefficient t←
〈
t,b∗k
〉
/‖b∗k‖2. If t ∈ Z, set c← t. Otherwise, pick c← btc+1
with probability t mod 1 and c← btc otherwise. Finally, return c ·bk +SGNP(Bk−1, t− c ·bk).
The following lemma is easily proved by induction through expanding the expectation and the
definition of the GSO.
Lemma 4.4.1 The expected value of SGNP(Bk, t) is t projected to span(Bk).
Proof: We prove this by induction on the dimension. For the base case, let the basis and target be
b, t ∈ R, respectively. Let p = t/b mod 1 (or equivalently t/b−bt/bc). Then the expectation of
SGNP(b, t) is
E[SGNP(b, t)] = b[bt/bc(1− p)+(bt/bc+1)p] = b(t/b) = t.
For the inductive step, we assume E[SGNP(Bk−1, t)] = spanBk−1(t). The coefficient c’s
expectation is c′ :=
〈
t,b∗k
〉
/‖b∗k‖2 via the same computation as the base case. The law of iterated
expectation gives us
E[SGNP(Bk, t)] = c′bk +
k−1
∑
i=1
〈t− c′bk,b∗i 〉
‖b∗i ‖2
b∗i .
The result follows from the definition of the GSO. 
To see SGNP(Bk, t)− t is subgaussian, we view the space in the basis generated by B∗k .
Since the coefficients of the output vector in this basis are chosen independently and by the
definition of the GSO, SGNP(Bk, t)− t is a subgaussian vector with parameter maxi ‖b∗i ‖.
Lemma 4.4.2 SGNP(Bk, t)− t is a subgaussian vector with parameter maxi ‖b∗i ‖.
Proof: The result is seen through expressing SGNP(Bk, t)− t in the GSO basis B∗k . Each
coordinate ci (coefficient of b∗i ) is subgaussian with parameter
√
2pi and is independent of the
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previous coordinates. As in Lemma 4.4.1’s proof, the result follows from the definition of the
GSO. 
4.5 Subgaussian Gadget Decomposition
In this section we present our main algorithms for the problem of subgaussian gad-
get decomposition using the gadget matrix G = In⊗ gt . Since this decomposition G−1(u) =
(g−1(ui))ni=1 can be computed one component at a time (even in-parallel!) we restrict our atten-
tion to efficiently computing the subgaussian function g−1 : Zq→ Zk in the one-dimensional
case, i.e., for n = 1.
The gadgets and algorithms in this section are parametrized by a “base” integer b, which
we consider as fixed throughout the section, but can be used to achieve different efficiency/quality
trade-offs. We distinguish two cases, depending on whether the modulus is a power q = bk of the
base b, or an arbitrary integer q< bk. In either case, no assumption is made about the factorization
of the modulus q. Later in this chapter we will extend the gadgets and algorithms from this section
to provide optimized treatment of large moduli with useful co-prime factorization q = ∏i qi,
where the input u ∈ Zq is given in CRT form (u mod q1, . . . ,u mod ql).
All algorithms in this section use the same gadget gt := (1,b, · · · ,bk−1), for k = dlogb qe,
but with different subgaussian decomposition procedures depending on the whether q is a power
of b. Notice that gt is a Zq-gadget of size k and quality β =
√
k(b/2).
The main result of this section is summarized in the following theorem2.
Theorem 4.5.1 For any integer base b > 1, integer modulus q > 1, k = dlogb qe and gadget
gt = [1,b, · · · ,bk−1], there is a subgaussian decomposition algorithm g−1 as follows:
• If q = bk, the algorithm runs in linear O(k) time (and space), uses log2 q random bits, and
achieves subgaussian parameter at most (b−1)√2pi .
2This theorem is most relevant when q is a relatively small modulus (say q< 264), so that arithmetic operations
modulo q can be performed with unit cost. For larger moduli, the theorem will be used as a building block for a
more complex algorithm using RNS/CRT representation for the elements of Zq.
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• If q 6= bk, the algorithm runs in linear O(k) time (and space), uses at most k log2 q random
bits, and achieves subgaussian parameter at most (b+1)
√
2pi ,
Notice how the generic solution obtained by applying Theorem 4.3.1 to our gadget g
only implies a polynomial time inversion algorithm with subgaussian parameter (b+1) ·√2kpi ,
and quadratic O(k2) time complexity (after a cubic time O(k3) preprocessing). Depending on
implementation details, this generic solution would also require the use of high precision floating
point numbers3 and a substantial amount of randomness for high precision sampling. By contrast,
the solution described in Theorem 4.5.1 is much more efficient (linear time and space, with no
need for preprocessing) and also achieves a smaller subgaussian parameter by a factor of
√
k.
Moreover, our specialized algorithms use a relatively small (almost optimal) number of random
bits, and can be implemented without the need for high-precision floating-point arithmetic.
A proof of Theorem 4.5.1 is given by the algorithms presented and analyzed in the next
two subsections for the two separate cases q = bk and q< bk.
4.5.1 Power-of-Base Case
Here we consider the subgaussian decomposition problem for the gadget
g = (1,b, . . . ,bk−1)
when q = bk, and the input is given as a positive coset representative u ∈ {0,1, · · · ,q−1}. Con-
ceptually, our solution to this problem is just a specialized/optimized version of the randomized-
rounding variant of Babai’s nearest plane algorithm [13, 10]. The general algorithm uses the
Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of a basis for the lattice Λ⊥q (gt) associated to the gadget g. The
optimization is based on the observation (from [66]) that for our gadget g and modulus q = bk,
3For a general integer basis B, the GSO can have numbers with denominators as large as ∏i ‖bi‖2.
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the lattice Λ⊥q (gt) has a very simple basis S, and an even simpler GSO S˜:
S =

b
−1 . . .
. . . b
−1 b

, S˜ = b · I.
Using this special structure, there is no need to explicitly compute and store the GSO, and the
randomized-rounding nearest-plane algorithm can be implemented in linear time and space O(k).
The specialized algorithm is best illustrated when b = 2, in which case it computes a randomized
“bit” decomposition of u as follows:
1. For i = 0, · · · ,k−1:
(a) if u is even, then set xi← 0,
(b) if u is odd, then choose xi←{−1,+1} uniformly at random
Update u← (u− xi)/2.
2. Return x = (x0,x1, · · · ,xk−1).
This is essentially the same as the standard (deterministic) bit decomposition algorithm, except
that when the bit is 1, we use a random ±1 digit. Since ±1 have the same parity modulo 2, the
algorithm works as expected, with the only difference that now each digit is a zero-mean random
variable, and the final output is subgaussian with parameter
√
2pi .
We can modify this algorithm to an arbitrary base b as follows. Let y := u mod b ∈
{0, · · · ,b− 1} for an input u ∈ Zq. Then, at each step, we pick the coset representative (of u
with respect to Zb) with expectation 0 from the set {y−b,y}. The resulting algorithm is given in
Figure 9. One can verify that this is the subgaussian nearest plane algorithm applied to the lattice
L (S) = Λ⊥q (gt), so the correctness of the algorithm is straightforward. Efficiency is also easily
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Algorithm 9: g−1(u) for q = bk.
Input: u ∈ {0,1, · · · ,q−1}
Output: subgaussian x ∈ Λ⊥u (gt) with parameter (b−1)
√
2pi
1 Let x← 0
2 for i← 0, · · · ,k−1 do
3 Let y← u mod b ∈ {0, · · · ,b−1}.
4 if y = 0 then
5 xi← 0.
6 else
7 with probability y/b, xi← y−b, and xi← y otherwise.
8 u← (u− xi)/b.
9 return x
analyzed by inspection. Notice that the algorithm is randomness efficient as it needs only one
random number in Zb for every interation, for a total of k · log2(b) = log2(q) random bits.
We remark that a similar algorithm is analyzed in [9], though with a loose bound on
its subgaussian parameter (there is an unnecessary
√
k factor in their subgaussian analysis).
This section’s main contribution is how to generalize the algorithm to arbitrary modulus q, as
described in the next subsection.
4.5.2 Arbitrary Modulus, Arbitrary Base
Unfortunately, the (randomized) nearest plane algorithm Λ⊥q (gt) does not specialize well
when the modulus q is not a power of b. The reason is that, while we can still use the same
gadget g = (1,b, . . . ,bk−1), the corresponding lattice Λ⊥q (gt) has a slightly different basis Sq
whose GSO is not diagonal, and not sparse. Our solution uses a technique developed in [42] for
the discrete Gaussian sampling problem. Specifically, we use the fact that Sq admits a sparse,
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triangular factorization
Sq =

b q0
−1 . . . ...
. . . b qk−2
−1 qk−1

=

b
−1 . . .
. . . b
−1 b


1 d0
. . . ...
1 dk−2
dk−1

= SD (4.1)
where (q0, · · · ,qk−1) are the (base b) digits of q, and the last column of D is defined by the
simple recurrence di =
di−1+qi
b with initial condition d−1 = 0. (Note that b
i+1di = q mod bi+1 ∈
{0, · · · ,bi+1−1}.)
Then, on input u ∈ {0,1, · · · ,q−1}, we proceed as follows:
1. Compute an arbitrary element u ∈ Zk of the lattice coset Λ⊥u (gt), for example u =
(u,0, . . . ,0).
2. Map u to t = S−1u by solving a sparse system of linear equations St = u (mod q).
3. Pick a subgaussian sample from the lattice cosetL (D)+ t.
4. Apply the (sparse) linear transformation S to the sample, to obtain a subgaussian sample
from Λ⊥u (gt).
Here the (randomized) nearest plane algorithm admits a simple and efficient specialization
because it is applied to a basis, D, which has a diagonal GSO. The linear transformations S−1
and S can also be computed in linear time because S is sparse and triangular. As a result, the
algorithm runs in linear time O(k) and does not require any pre-processing. Finally, we get an
output with subgaussian parameter (b+1)
√
2pi since S has small spectral norm.
The actual algorithm is given in Algorithm 10. The algorithm directly implements the
outline given above, but it is specialized/optimized to avoid the explicit computation of the sparse
matrices S,D, and to use only integer numbers (avoids floating point numbers). Details about the
correctness and analysis of the algorithm are provided in the rest of this section.
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Algorithm 10: g−1(u)
Input: u ∈ {0,1, · · · ,q−1}
Output: subgaussian x ∈ Λ⊥u (gt) with parameter (b+1)
√
2pi
1 Let u← [u]kb, x,y← 0
2 x← 0,q = [q]kb.
3 set xk−1← 0 with probability (q−u)/q and xk−1←−1 otherwise.
4 for i = k−2, · · · ,0 do
5 u← u−ui+1bi+1,q← q−qi+1bi+1.
6 Let c←−(u+ xk−1q).
7 if c< 0 then
8 p← (c+bi+1), z←−1.
9 else
10 p← c, z← 0.
11 set xi← z+1 with probability p/bi+1 and xi← z otherwise.
12 for i ∈ {0, · · · ,k−2} do
13 yi← b · xi− xi−1+ xk−1 ·qi+ui.
14 yk−1←−xk−2+ xk−1 ·qk−1+uk−1.
15 return y.
Lemma 4.5.1 The first loop of Algorithm 10 performs the subgaussian nearest plane algorithm
on the lattice generated by D around target t :=−S−1[u]kb.
Proof: Let d be the last column of D. The last entry of t is tk−1 = −u/bk and the
last entry of d is dk−1 = q/bk. Therefore, we are randomly rounding xk−1 around the center〈
t, d˜
〉
/‖d˜‖2 =−u/q ∈ (−1,0].
For the remainder of the loop, we note that t = −S−1 ·u has entries ti = −(∑ij=0 u j ·
b j)/bi+1, represented by the recurrence relation ti = ti−1/b+ui/b, t0 =−u0/b. This matches
the recurrence relation for d, di = (∑ij=0 q j ·b j)/bi+1 since d = S−1[q]kb, so we can compute the
remaining centers for the nearest plane algorithm by these recurrences. Specifically, we are
performing a randomized rounding around the centers ci = ti− xk−1di =−(∑il=0 ul ·bl + xk−1 ·
∑ij=0 q j · b j)/bi+1 ∈ (−1,1). These centers are stored as c in the pseudocode. The variable z
represents the two parallel planes (copies ofL ([d1, · · · ,di−1]) shifted by integer multiples of di)
separated by d˜i. The lemma follows. 
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By storing d = S−1[q]kb in-advance, one can change the code to sample the first k− 1
coordinates of x in-parallel sinceL (d0, · · · ,dk−2) = Zk−1⊕{0}. The proof of Theorem 4.5.1
follows below.
Proof: For the case q= bk, Algorithm 9 returns a subgaussian sample x ∈Λ⊥u (gt) with parameter
(b−1)√2pi in time and space O(logb q) while consuming log2(q) of random bits by inspection,
and Lemma 4.2.2.
Alternatively, let q 6= bk. Now by Lemma 4.5.1, x after the first loop is so that Dx is the
output of subgaussian nearest plane algorithm on D centered around −S−1u. By Lemma 4.2.3,
Sqx+u is a subgaussian vector with parameter
√
λmax(S ·St)
√
2pi , where λmax(S ·St) is the
maximum eigenvalue of S ·St . A routine calculation for S ·St’s entries and the Gersˇgorin Circle
Theorem (Theorem 2.1.3) imply λmax(S · St) ≤ (b+ 1)2. Since during each iteration in the
first loop we draw a random number in Zbi to represent p, the algorithm consumes exactly
log2 b(1+2+ · · ·+ k) = log2 b · (k2+ k)/2 random bits. 
4.6 Gadget Decoding
Here we discuss our main algorithm for the problem of LWE gadget decoding, defined in
this chapter’s introduction, on the gadget matrix G = In⊗gt with entries in Zq, for an arbitrary
modulus q. Given a vt = stG+ et ∈ Znkq as input, we can break the vector into n components of
length k, then decode (in-parallel) each component with respect to gt . Therefore, we focus on
decoding gt as a gadget for Zq.
Our algorithm and its respective gadgets are parameterized by an integer “base” b. We
consider b as fixed in this section, though varying b for a fixed modulus q yields efficiency/quality
trade-offs for these gadgets. Later in this chapter, we present a CRT gadget that can be used to
efficiently decode an input given in CRT form.
Let k = dlogb qe and the gadget be gt = (1,b, · · · ,bk−1). The vector gt is a size k gadget
of quality (b/2)
√
k for Zq. The results in this section are summarized in the following theorem.
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Theorem 4.6.1 For every modulus q, and gadget gt = (1,b, · · · ,bk−1), there is a time and space
O(k) algorithm decoding gt with tolerance q/2(b+1).
A proof of Theorem 4.6.1 is given by the algorithm presented in this section. Note,
Theorem 4.3.1 implies a polynomial time decoding algorithm for gt with error tolerance ‖e‖∞ ≤
q/2
√
k(b+1). Our decoding algorithm is more efficient and has a higher error tolerance by a
factor
√
k than the general gadgets decoding guarantee given by Theorem 4.3.1.
An optimized, linear time and space O(k), decoding algorithm is given in [66] for the
case q = bk. The reason for this algorithm’s efficiency is that the commonly used basis for
Λbk(gt) results in a linear time nearest plane algorithm. In more detail, a basis for Λbk(gt) in
this case is the triangular matrix Bbk = bk ·S−t , where S is the commonly used basis for Λ⊥bk(gt)
presented in the preliminaries, and this basis has a GSO of (q/b) · I.
However, the simple decoding idea presented in [66] fails when q 6= bk. Because Λq(gt)’s
commonly used basis has a dense GSO, Babai’s nearest plane algorithm takes time O(k2) and
space O(k3) when naively applied on Λ⊥q (gt).
Efficient Decoding Algorithm
The intuition for our algorithm is best initially viewed through the case when q = bk.
Given an input v, another way to decode the lattice Λbk(gt) is to use St as a linear transformation,
decode Stv to the lattice bk ·Zk with the nearest plane algorithm, then map the nearest point in
bk ·Zk back to Λbk(gt). This leads to a slightly stronger condition on the noise vector e since we
now need Ste ∈P1/2(q · I), which is satisfied if ‖e‖∞ < q/2(b+1). Though there is no need to
do this given the algorithm in [66], this is essentially what we will do in the case when q 6= bk.
Overview
The overview of our efficient decoding algorithm for an arbitrary modulus is as follows.
First recall the sparse, triangular factorization of Λ⊥q (gt)’s commonly used basis given in the
preliminaries, Sq = SD. The duality relation for q-ary lattices, Λq(gt) = q ·Λ⊥q (gt)∗, dictates that
a basis for Λq(gt) is q ·S−tq = S−t(q ·D−t). Luckily, the matrix D−t is sparse with a diagonal
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Algorithm 11: DECODEG(v,b,r[q]kb)
Input: v ∈ Zk, b, and q = [q]kb.
Output: s ∈ Zq where v = sgt + et as long as ‖e‖∞ < q/2(b+1).
1 for i← 0, · · · ,k−2 do
2 vi← bvi− vi+1.
3 vk−1← b · vk−1.
4 Let x← 0 and reg← 0.
5 for i← 0, · · · ,k−2 do
6 xi← dvi/qc and reg← reg/b+bk−1 ·qi.
7 vk−1← vk−1+ xi · reg.
8 xk−1← dvk−1/bkc.
9 Let s← xk−1 and reg← 0.
10 for i← k−2, · · · ,0 do
11 reg← b · reg+qi+1.
12 s← s+ xi · reg
13 return s mod q.
GSO, andP1/2(q · D˜−t)⊇P1/2(q · I) (meaning we can decode as long as ‖e‖∞ < q/2(b+1)).
Therefore, we can decode gt by the following.
1. Given v, first apply St as a linear transformation.
2. Then, decode the vector Stv to the lattice generated by qD−t using the nearest plane
algorithm.
Both steps can be computed in linear time and space, O(k), given the sparsity of S and qD−t ,
and qD−t’s diagonal GSO.
The pseudocode for our algorithm is shown in DECODEG. In short, the algorithm has
three components, where each is represented by a loop in the pseudocode. These components
are to first compute the linear transformation on the input v← Stv, then to run the nearest
plane algorithm on the lattice generated by q ·D−t , and finally to return s represented as the first
entry of the nearest lattice point in Λq(gt) modulo q. The proof of Theorem 4.6.1 follows from
Lemmas 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 below.
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Lemma 4.6.1 The second loop in DECODEG is an instantiation of Babai’s nearest plane
algorithm on the lattice q ·D−t given target Stv, running in time and space O(k).
Proof: Recall the structure of D from the previous chapter, D = [M|d] where Mt =
[Ik−1|0] and d has entries di = (q mod bi+1)/bi+1, with q mod bi+1 ∈ {0,1, · · · ,bi+1− 1}.
Then, it follows that qD−t has a similar triangular, sparse structure. This is given by q ·D−t =qIk−1 0
ct bk
 and the vector c ∈ Zk−1 has entries ci = −bk−1−i · (q0 + bq1 + · · ·+ biqi) =
−bk−1−i · (q mod bi+1) ∈ [−q,0]. Further, the entries of c satisfy the recurrence relation −ci =
−(ci−1)
b +b
k−1qi with the initial condition −c0 = bk−1q0. The variable reg in DECODEG stores
ci, and it is updated using the recurrence relation for c. The vector x in the pseudocode stores
the coefficients of the nearest lattice point expressed in the basis qD−t . The Lemma follows by
inspection. 
Lemma 4.6.2 The last loop in DECODEG computes s mod q in time and space O(k).
Proof: Represent the first row of B = S−tqD−t as h, and note 〈h,x〉 = s mod q. A
careful analysis of qD−t and S−t gives us an expression for h’s entries: hi = qi+1+bqi+2+ · · ·+
bk−i−2qk−1 =
q−(q mod bi+1)
bi+1 for i ∈ {0,1, · · · ,k− 2} and hk−1 = 1. All but the last entry of h
satisfy the recurrence relation hi = qi+1+b ·hi+1 for i ∈ {0, · · · ,k−2}, with an initial value of
qk−1 (which is not the actual value of h’s last entry). We use this recurrence relation to compute
h’s entries one at a time in the last loop, stored in the variable reg. The Lemma follows by
inspection. 
4.7 Gadgets for the CRT Representation
Many applications of lattice gadgets require a large modulus that, for secure and func-
tional sets of parameters, surpasses the native 64-bit integer arithmetic in a modern machine’s
hardware. One common method to circumvent the use of multi-precision numbers is to pick a
67
modulus of the form q =∏qi with each qi less than 64 bits. Then, one can store an element
u ∈ Zq as its Chinese Remainder representation (CRT form4) as (u mod q1, · · · ,u mod ql) and
perform computations via the Chinese Remainder Theorem, utilizing the ring isomorphism
Zq ∼= Zq1 × ·· ·×Zql . Simple forms of the gadget matrix (e.g. power of two matrix) are not
compatible with this representation because the binary digits of a number cannot be easily recov-
ered from the CRT components without a costly reconstruction phase involving large numbers
modulo q.
In this section, we discuss a gadget for the CRT form. As usual, the gadget admits a
compact (implicit) representation, and does not need to be computed and stored explicitly. Most
importantly, the gadget allows us to use the algorithms in Sections 4.5 and 4.6 in order to perform
subgaussian decomposition, discrete Gaussian sampling, and LWE gadget decoding all given
input represented in CRT form. This has several theoretical and practical advantages: (1) the
algorithms can be directly used by efficient applications that already store their numbers in CRT
form, (2) our algorithms can be easily parallelized as they operate on each CRT component
independently, (3) all algorithms only require arithmetic on small numbers (at most maxi qi) even
if the modulus q =∏i qi may be very big. (Efficient solutions to Discrete Gaussian Sampling
for the individual moduli qi, as needed by our CRT DGS algorithm, are given in [66, 42].) We
remark that a balanced, deterministic digit decomposition is provided in [38, 71], and an LWE
decoding algorithm for a CRT/RNS hybrid gadget for general rings is given in the library’s code5
(without an analysis). Our results are summarized in the following theorem. We emphasize the
analysis below assumes integer operations, including reductions modulo qi, are done in constant
time. This is because our algorithms are best implemented when each qi is less than 64 bits,
avoiding the use of multi-precision numbers.
Theorem 4.7.1 Let q have factorization q =∏li=1 qi into coprime factors {qi}, (bi)li=1 be an
l-tuple of bases with bi < qi for all i, and let k = ∑ki where ki = dlogbi qie. There exists a
4This is also known as the residue number system (RNS) in previous works.
5https://github.com/cpeikert/Lol/blob/master/lol/Crypto/Lol/Gadget.hs
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Algorithm 12: Sampling in CRT
form.
Input: (u1, · · · ,ul)
Output: g−1CRT (u1, · · · ,ul).
1 for i ∈ {1, · · · , l} do
2 xi← g−1i (ui).
3 return x = (x1, · · · ,xl).
Algorithm 13: Decoding in CRT
form.
Input: vt = s ·gCRT + et mod q
Output: (s1, · · · ,sl).
1 Let v = (v1, · · · ,vl) for each
vi ∈ Zkiq .
2 for i ∈ {1, · · · , l} do
3 si← DECODECRT(vi)
4 return (s1, · · · ,sl).
Figure 4.1. Pseudocode for the parallel algorithms given in Theorem 4.7.1. We let g−1i (·) denote
either the subgaussian decomposition algorithm given in Section 4.5 or a discrete Gaussian
sampler.
gadget, gtCRT , for Zq of size k and quality maxi bi/2. Further, the gadget satisfies the following
properties:
• Subgaussian decomposition can be performed in-parallel with l processors, each using
time and space O(ki), consuming less than ki log2 qi random bits ((log2(qi) random bits if
qi = b
ki
i )) and with parameter at most (maxi(bi)+1)
√
2pi .
• For any ε > 0, discrete Gaussian sampling can be performed in-parallel with l processors,
each in time and space O(ki) with width s ≥ O(b1.5j )ηε(Zk j) for index j maximizing√
2b j(b j +1) ·ηε(Zk j).
• gtCRT is decodable in-parallel with l processors in time and space O(ki) with tolerance
q/2(maxi(bi)+1).
As expected, each processor gets slightly more efficient whenever qi = b
ki
i . The algo-
rithms are represented in Figure 4.1.
The CRT Gadget
For each coprime factor qi, fix the base-bi gadget vector as gti := (1,bi, · · · ,bki−1i ) where
ki = dlogbi(qi)e. Let k = ∑i ki, q∗i = q/qi, and qˆi = (q∗i )−1 mod qi. Consider the gadget vector,
which we call the general CRT gadget, gtCRT = (q
∗
1qˆ1 ·gt1, · · · ,q∗l qˆl ·gtl) mod q ∈ Z1×kq . This is
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Algorithm 14: DECODECRT(vi,bi, t = [qi]kibi,q,q
∗
i )
Input: vi ∈ Zki , bi, q∗i , q, and t = [qi]kibi .
Output: s mod qi where v = sgt + et mod q as long as ‖e‖∞ < q/2(bi+1).
1 for j← 0, · · · ,ki−1 do
2 v j← b jv j− v j+1.
3 Let x← 0.
4 for j ∈ {0, · · · ,ki−2} do
5 x j← dv j/qc.
6 xk−1← d(vk−1−
〈
c,xk−20
〉
)/(q∗i bi
ki)c.
7 Let si← xk−1 and reg← 0.
8 for j← ki−2, · · · ,0 do
9 reg← b · reg+ t j+1 ·q∗i .
10 si← si+ x j · reg
11 return si mod qi.
a generalization of the gadgets (or implicit in algorithms) used in [22, 53, 55, 15]. As before, the
gadget matrix is the block-diagonal matrix G := In⊗gtCRT . Theorem 4.7.1 follows from the fact
Λ⊥q (gtCRT ) = Λ
⊥
q1(g
t
1)⊕·· ·⊕Λ⊥ql(gtl), Theorem 4.5.1, and Proposition 3.1 in [42]. The parallel
decoding algorithm is obtained by a slight adaptation to DECODEG presented in Section 4.6, and
is analyzed in the Section 4.7.1. We prove the direct sum decomposition of Λ⊥q (gtCRT ).
Proof: For the inclusion ⊇, let xi ∈ Λ⊥qi(gti) be arbitrary with x = (x1, · · · ,xl) as their concatena-
tion. Then, 〈xi,gti〉= aqi ∈ qi ·Z and 〈x,gCRT 〉 mod q =∑li=1 q∗i qˆi 〈xi,gi〉 mod q = 0+ · · ·+0
mod q. We prove the converse by inducting on l, the number of q’s coprime factors. The base
case is routine. Now consider x = (x1, · · · ,xl) ∈ Λ⊥q (gtCRT ) with xi ∈ Λ⊥qi(gti) for i = 0, · · · , l−1
and xl ∈ Zkl . By the inductive hypothesis, 〈x,gCRT 〉 mod q = q∗l qˆl ·
〈
xl,gtl
〉
= 0 mod q. View-
ing this equation in Z and dividing both sides by q∗l implies qˆl · 〈xl,gl〉 mod ql = 0. Finally, we
conclude 〈xl,gl〉 mod ql = 0 since qˆl is a multiplicative unit in Zql . 
4.7.1 Decoding the CRT Gadget
Here we show how the efficient gadget decoding algorithm from Section 4.6 adapts
to the general CRT gadget described in Section 4.7. Recall the decomposition of gt’s lattice,
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Λ⊥q (gt)=Λ⊥q1(g
t
1)⊕·· ·⊕Λ⊥ql(gtl) =L (Sq1)⊕·· ·⊕L (Sql). The duality relation for q-ary lattices
yields Λq(gt) = q · (Λ⊥q (gt))∗ = q ·
(⊕
iL (S−tqi D
−t
qi )
)
=
(⊕
iL (S−tqi q
∗
i · (qi ·D−tqi ))
)
.
Now we have a clear way to decode the general CRT gadget. First, break the input into l
blocks, vt = sgt + et mod q = (vt1, · · · ,vtl) where vti = s ·q∗i qˆigti + eti mod q. Then, we compute
the following. First, transform vi to Stqivi. Then, decode S
t
qivi to the lattice q
∗
i (qiD−tqi ). Finally,
return s mod qi. The pseudocode is given as the algorithm DECODECRT. Another change is
that we store the vector c in memory. Recall, c has k−2 entries of the form c j =−bki−1− ji (qi
mod b ji ). Note that the correctness condition of our algorithm is still ‖et‖∞ < q/2(maxi(bi)+1).
Decoding in CRT Form
Here we describe how DECODECRT can decode v= sg+e where the input is given in its
CRT representation. The ideas sketched here follow from [55]. The linear transformation v→ Stv
is easily computed given the CRT form of v. Really, we are only concerned with divisions and
integer rounding. In the second loop, note that x j ← dv j/qc = d∑lo=1[(v mod qo) · (qˆo/qo)]c.
Next we consider the line xk−1← d(vk−1+
〈
c,xk−20
〉
)/(q∗i bi
ki)c. First, note that vk−1/(bkii q∗i ) =
b−kii ·∑lo=1(vk−1 mod qo) · qˆo(qi/qo). This should be a small number in nearly all practical
instantiations. Lastly, we note that we return s in CRT form, but we can alter the algorithm to
return s ∈ (−q/2,q/2] via a simple change. The s computed in the last loop is actually s ·q∗i qˆi.
So, we can remove the mod qi in the return statement and sum up the output from the l parallel
processors, ∑i(s ·q∗i qˆi) = s ·∑i(q∗i qˆi) = s ·1 mod q.
4.8 Toolkit Implementation and Its Application
4.8.1 Software Implementation
We implemented most of the algorithms presented in this work in PALISADE [73],
a modular open-source lattice cryptography library that includes ring-based implementations
of homomorphic encryption, proxy re-encryption, identity-based encryption, attribute-based
encryption, and other lattice schemes. More concretely, we added a new lattice gadget toolkit
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module to PALISADE that implements the following algorithms:
• Subgaussian gadget decomposition (Algorithm 10) for arbitrary moduli and gadget bases.
• Efficient gadget in CRT representation, enabling both trapdoor sampling and subgaussian
gadget decomposition in the CRT representation.
• Subgaussian gadget decomposition for cyclotomic rings both in positional and CRT number
systems, which wraps around Algorithm 10.
The toolkit module complements/improves the lattice gadget algorithms previously added to
PALISADE, such as trapdoor sampling for cyclotomic rings proposed in [42] and implemented
in [52, 37]. The full lattice gadget capability will be included in the next major public release of
PALISADE.
4.8.2 Optimized Variant of Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
We use the lattice gadget toolkit algorithms to build and implement a full RNS/CRT
variant of the short-secret Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) scheme originally
proposed in [19] and implemented for cyclotomic rings in [39]. The KP-ABE scheme is a
complex cryptographic primitive that can be used for attribute-based access control applications,
as well as a building block for audit log encryption, targeted broadcast encryption, predicate
encryption, functional encryption, and some forms of program obfuscation [19, 49].
Overview
ABE is a public key cryptography primitive that enables the decryption of a ciphertext by
a user only if a specific access policy (defined over ` attributes) is satisfied. In the key-policy
scenario, a message is encrypted using the attribute values as public keys, and a specific access
policy is typically defined afterwards. When the access policy becomes known, a secret key for
the policy is generated (using trapdoor sampling in our KP-ABE scheme), and the ciphertexts
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and public keys are homomorphically evaluated over the policy circuit (using a GSW-type
homomorphic multiplication in our KP-ABE scheme).
The short-secret KP-ABE scheme is a tuple of functions, namely Setup, Encrypt,
EvalPK, KeyGen, EvalCT, and Decrypt, whose definitions are:
• SETUP(1λ , `)→ {MPK, MSK}: Given a security parameter λ and the number of attributes
`, a trusted private key generator (PKG) generates a master public key MPK and a master
secret key MSK. MPK contains the ABE public parameters while MSK includes the trapdoor
that is used by PKG to generate secret keys for access policies.
• ENCRYPT(µ,x,MPK)→ C: Using MPK and attribute values x ∈ {0,1}`, sender encrypts
the message µ and outputs the ciphertext C.
• EVALPK(MPK,x, f )→ PK f : Homomorphically evaluate MPK over a policy (Boolean circuit)
f : {0,1}`→{0,1} to generate a public key PK f for the policy f .
• KEYGEN(MSK,MPK,PK f )→ SK f : Given MSK, MPK and policy-specific PK f , PKG generates
the secret key SK f corresponding to f . PKG sends SK f to the receiver that is authorized to
decrypt ciphertexts encrypted under f .
• EVALCT(C,x, f )→ C f : Homomorphically evaluate C over the policy f to generate the
ciphertext C f .
• DECRYPT(C f ,SK f )→ µ¯: Given the homomorphically computed ciphertext C f and cor-
responding secret key SK f , find µ¯ , which is the same as the original message µ if the
receiver has the secret key matching the policy f .
The most computationally expensive operations are EVALPK and EVALCT, which
homomorphically evaluate a circuit of depth dlog2 `e using the GSW homomorphic multiplication
approach. At each level of a Boolean circuit composed of NAND gates (which are used for
benchmark evaluation in [39]), the algorithms compute matrix products B2iG−1(−Bi) and
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(
G−1(−Ci)
)t C2i for public keys and ciphertexts, respectively. Here, Bi ∈ R1×mq , Ci ∈ Rmq ,
Rq = Zq[x]/〈xn+1〉, and m = dlogb qe+ 2 (the latter corresponds to the Ring-LWE trapdoor
construction). Note that that the gadget G is extended in this case to m by adding two zero entries
to the decomposed digits.
The work [39] presents a CPU implementation of the ring variant of the KP-ABE
scheme along with an efficient GPU implementation for policy evaluation and encryption. The
CPU implementation was done for a binary gadget base and used the conversion from CRT to
the positional number system for digit decomposition both in trapdoor sampling and gadget
decomposition. To avoid the linear noise growth O(nm) in gadget decomposition, the authors
used a balanced digit decomposition, namely the binary non-adjacent form (NAF), that replaces
digits in (0,1) with a zero-centered representation in (-1,0,1). Although this approach allows one
to achieve a heuristic growth close to O(
√
nm) in the case of the KP-ABE scheme, the noise
properties depend on the randomness of the input, i.e., this approach is deterministic.
The CPU runtimes for policy evaluation and encryption operations in [39] were far from
practical (the CPU results only for ` up to 8 are presented), and hence the authors developed an
efficient GPU implementation for these operations.
For detailed algorithms of the KP-ABE scheme, the reader is referred to [39].
Our Optimizations
We present a full CRT/RNS ring variant of the KP-ABE scheme that leverages the
lattice gadget toolkit to significantly (by more than one order of magnitude) speed up the policy
evaluation operations. In particular, our implementation includes the following optimizations as
compared to [39]:
• The subgaussian gadget decomposition in CRT representation to minimize the noise
growth instead of the NAF decomposition with the conversion from CRT representation to
positional system. This provides a theoretical guarantee of the square-root noise growth.
To achieve the repeatability of randomized decomposition in EVALPK and EVALCT, we
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use the same seed for the random operations in subgaussian gadget decomposition. The
seed is treated as part of the master public key.
• The CRT variant of trapdoor sampling using the gadget decomposition technique discussed
in this paper in contrast to the multiprecision digit decomposition in [39].
• The RNS/CRT scaling proposed in [54] for decryption in contrast to the multiprecision
scaling.
• Increased gadget base b (both in trapdoor and subgaussian gadget decomposition) instead
of the binary base.
Parameter Selection
As the correctness constraint in [39] was derived for the classical binary-base gadget
decomposition, we provide here a modified version incorporating the effect of a larger gadget
base for the case of subgaussian gadget decomposition:
q> 4C1sσ
√
mn
(
b
√
mn
)d
, (4.2)
where C1 = 128, s = C ·σ2(b+ 1) · (
√
n logb q+
√
2n+ 4.7), C = 1.8, σ ≈ 4.578, and d =
dlog2 `e. Here, C and C1 are empirical parameters chosen the same way as in [39].
The differences compared to [39] are the b factor in the exponentiation base (as the
digits vary between −b and b in subgaussian gadget decomposition) and a (b+1) factor in the
expression for s (contributed by Gaussian sampling; see [42, 37] for a more detailed discussion
of the Gaussian distribution parameter for arbitrary gadget bases).
4.9 Experimental Results
We ran the experiments in PALISADE version 1.2, which includes NTL version 10.5.0
and GMP version 6.1.2. The evaluation environment was a commodity desktop computer system
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Figure 4.2. Runtime baseline of subgaussian sampling rate for native uniformly random integers
(w.r.t a 60-bit modulus). When b = 2r, the modulo reduction in digit decomposition is performed
by simple bit shifting. When b is arbitrary, the slower hardware modulo operation is used.
with an Intel Core i7-3770 CPU with 4 cores rated at 3.40GHz and 16GB of memory, running
Linux CentOS 7. The compiler was g++ (GCC) 5.3.1.
4.9.1 Subgaussian Gadget Decomposition
The experiments described in this section were all performed in the single-threaded
mode. The goal of these results is to provide the performance baselines for subgaussian gadget
decomposition, demonstrate the benefits of the efficient gadget in CRT representation, and
illustrate the effect of subgaussian sampling on the noise growth in GSW-type products.
Figure 4.2 shows the dependence of subgaussian gadget decomposition rate (per decom-
posed integer) on the gadget base for native (64-bit) integers. The results are shown both for a
power-of-two base, which supports fast modulo reduction by bit shifting, and an arbitrary base,
which requires a division-based modulo operation on x86 architectures. In our implementation,
the native arithmetic is a building block for performing operations in CRT representation for
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Figure 4.3. Comparison of sampling rates for CRT and multiprecision (MP) variants of subgaus-
sian gadget decomposition for ring elements with 4096 coefficients and 60-bit CRT moduli at
r = dlog2 be = 20.
integers that are larger than 60 bits, and, therefore, these results can be used to estimate the run-
times for larger CRT-represented integers. Figure 4.2 illustrates that the sampling rate increases
in a discrete manner as we raise the gadget base because the number of digits is determined
by d60/ log2 be. The runtime is dominated by the randomized operations (as the difference
between a power-of-two-base and arbitrary-base scenarios is relatively small), thus limiting the
advantages of choosing the faster power-of-two bases. This suggests that a CRT representation
in terms of powers of primes, where the primes are used as the residue bases, might be preferred
in some instances (where an efficient implemention of arithmetic over prime powers is available)
over power-of-two bases.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the benefits of using the efficient gadget in CRT representation
when working with cyclotomic rings. The conversion from CRT representation to the positional
system followed by digit decomposition w.r.t a large modulus slows down subgaussian gadget
decomposition rate by almost one order of magnitude. We also observe that the difference in
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Figure 4.4. Noise growth for GSW-type multiplication in the ring-based KP-ABE variant (k =
180, n = 1024, b = 2). The base in the exponentiation is (mn)β , where m = k+2 = 182 and β
describes the rate of noise growth. The slope of the linear interpolation is β log2(mn).
performance between a power-of-two base and an arbitrary base is relatively small for both cases.
Figure 4.4 demonstrates the differences in the noise growth of GSW-type products using
the subgaussian and classical binary gadget decomposition methods. For this experiment, we
generated an error vector in Rm and iteratively multiplied it by G−1(Ui), where Ui is a vector of
uniformly random ring elements in Rmq at level i. We applied the tree multiplication approach
(rather than a sequential evaluation in a right-associative manner, which reduces the noise when
dealing with a chained product of fresh encryptions in GSW [30, 10]) to emulate the noise
growth in evaluating a Boolean policy circuit in the KP-ABE scheme. We considered both the
cases when the same U was used at all levels (correlated ciphertexts) and different Ui at each
level. The results were approximately the same for both scenarios because the classical gadget
decomposition matrix is centered at 0.5 (see [39] for a more detailed discussion of the classical
gadget decomposition case).
Figure 4.4 suggests that the noise growth in the subgaussian gadget decomposition case
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Table 4.1. Comparison of performance results for our KP-ABE variant (in bold) vs. the
implementation in [39] (in parentheses). EVALCT* = EVALPK + EVALCT corresponds to the
scenario when the policy evaluation of public keys and ciphertexts is done at the same time.
` k log2 n r KEYGEN ENCRYPT EVALCT* EVALPK DECRYPT RAM
[ms] [ms] [s] [s] [ms] [MB]
2 50 (44) 11 (11) 5 (1) 40 (126) 7 (33) 0.023 (0.44) 0.021 (0.42) 1.8 (3.0) 19 (58.5)
4 100 (52) 12 (12) 20 (1) 64 (143) 15 (57) 0.072 (1.76) 0.064 (1.68) 3.9 (3.5) 36.4 (86.3)
8 120 (60) 13 (13) 15 (1) 151 (317) 56 (222) 0.59 (10.8) 0.53 (10.4) 8.9 (7.7) 94.1 (255)
16 180 (70) 13 (13) 20 (1) 177 (419) 157 (1,483) 1.68 (429) 1.48 (427) 11.5 (18.1) 230 (2,867)
32 180 13 15 206 414 5.67 5.0 13.46 508
64 204 13 17 226 1,052 13.1 11.2 16.39 1,229
128 300 14 25 568 6,454 98.3 85.5 45.43 7,024
has a square-root dependence on mn (β ≈ 0.5) while the classical gadget decomposition approach
results in almost linear noise growth (β ≈ 0.9). Note that the intercept is lower for classical
gadget decomposition because the infinity norm of digits is 1 (only 0 or 1 are possible) vs. 2 in
the case of subgaussian decomposition (the allowed integer values are in the range from -2 to 2).
However, this advantage does not propagate to the second level of the circuit as the square-root
dependence of subgaussian gadget decomposition already plays a more dominant role here.
4.9.2 Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
Table 4.1 shows the performance results for our implementation along with the corre-
sponding results for the implementation in [39]. The first three rows for the results in [39] were
obtained using native (64-bit) integer arithmetic and the last row used a multiprecision backend
in PALISADE based on NTL/GMP. The experiments were run for 4 threads on a commodity
desktop system, i.e., Intel Core i7-3770 CPU with 4 cores at 3.40GHz and 16GB of memory
running CentOS 7. Both variants were implemented in PALISADE v1.2.
To choose the ring dimension n for both implementations, we ran the LWE security
estimator6 (commit 560525) [6] to find the lowest security levels for the uSVP, decoding, and
dual attacks following the standard homomorphic encryption security recommendations [5]. We
selected the least value of the number of security bits λ for all 3 attacks on classical computers
6https://bitbucket.org/malb/lwe-estimator
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based on the estimates for the BKZ sieve reduction cost model. All results are presented for at
least 128 bits of security.
Table 4.1 suggests there is a speed-up of 2.1x to 3.2x for key generation, where the lattice
trapdoor sampling subroutine is called. The speed-up for encryption is 3.8x to 9.5x, which is
mostly attributed to the use of a larger gadget base. The speed-ups for the main bottleneck
operations of homomorphic public key and ciphertext evaluation are in the range from 18x to
289x, which is a combined effect of subgaussian gadget decomposition in CRT and a larger
gadget base. The decryption runtimes are comparable, and already fast for both implementations.
The memory requirements for our optimized variant are 2.4x to 12.5x smaller.
Note that the performance of the KP-ABE variant in [39] dramatically degrades after
switching from the native arithmetic (when k≤ 60 bits) to the multiprecision backend (for gadget
decomposition), which is observed for `= 16 in Table 4.1. This implies the efficient gadgets in
CRT representation are critical for supporting deeper Boolean circuits with CPU systems.
We also profiled the contributions of subgaussian gadget decomposition and the number
theoretic transforms (NTT) of the digit-decomposed matrix (needed for matrix multiplication) to
the runtimes for homomorphic policy evaluation of ciphertexts (EVALCT*). The contribution
of subgaussian gadget decomposition was in the range from 15% to 22% w.r.t. the total homo-
morphic policy evaluation runtime. The contribution of the related NTTs was between 47% and
63%, suggesting that the latter is the main bottleneck of homomorphic circuit evaluation in our
KP-ABE variant.
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Chapter 5
Subgaussian Analysis for Lattice Trap-
doors
5.1 Introduction
Anyone tasked with measuring the concrete security of a cryptographic scheme built
on the MP12 [66] lattice trapdoor, which relies on the short integer solution problem [4, 67],
needs to understand the concentration of the largest singular value of a distribution of random
matrices with subgaussian entries. Previously, the state of the art in concentration bounds for
these matrices’ singular values scaled with a mysterious constant value [79]. This is unsatisfying
for the cryptographer interested in estimating the costs of a scheme prior to implementation.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold: first to find the exact constants in these
singular values’ concentration bounds, then to find the actual singular values appearing in-
practice. Note, the provable bounds are for a broad class of random matrices and, as expected,
the bounds are not as tight as one sees in-practice on the set of commonly-used distributions.
5.2 A Concentration Bound on Subgaussian Matrices with
Exact Constants
In this section we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 5.2.1 Let A be an m×n random matrix whose rows ai are independent, zero-mean,
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σ -isotropic, subgaussian random vectors with parameter s> 0. Then, for any t ≥ 0
σ
[√
m−C(s2/σ2)(√n+ t)]≤ sn(A)≤ s1(A)≤ σ [√m+C(s2/σ2)(√n+ t)]
for C =
√
4e1+2/e ln9/
√
pi and with probability at least 1−2e−t2 .
Note, the normalized matrix (1/σ)A has isotropic rows. We remark the proof is nearly identical
to [79] except here we pay special attention to the constants in the proof.
5.2.1 Useful Lemmas
We will need the following Fact.
Lemma 5.2.1 Let X be a subgaussian random variable with parameter s> 0, then
E[|X |k]1/k ≤ s
√
k
e−1/e
√
2pi
= s ·O
(√
k
)
for all k > 0.
Proof: Since |X | is a non-negative random variable, we have
E[|X |k] =
∫ ∞
0
Pr{|X |k > t}dt ≤ 2
∫ ∞
0
exp(−pit2/k/s2)dt.
The inequality is by Fact 2.3.1. Next, we perform a change of variables. Let u := pit2/k/s2 so we
have the following:
E[|X |k]≤
(
s√
pi
)k
k
∫ ∞
0
exp(−u)uk/2−1du =
(
s√
pi
)k
k ·Γ(k/2)1/k.
Now the bounds Γ(k/2)≤ (k/2)k/2 (from Stirling’s approximation) and k1/k ≤ e1/e (calculus)
for all k > 0 give us
E[|X |k]1/k ≤ s√
2pi
e1/e
√
k.
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Lemma 5.2.2 Let X be a positive random variable. Then, for all i, j ∈ Z+, we have
cov(X i,Y j) = E[X i+ j]−E[X i]E[X j]≥ 0.
Proof: Recall Jensen’s inequality: ϕ(E[Y ])≤ E[ϕ(Y )] for all random variables Y and all convex
functions ϕ . This gives us
E[X i](i+ j)/i ≤ E[X i+ j], E[X j](i+ j)/ j ≤ E[X i+ j].
Let us raise the first inequality to the i/(i+ j)-th power and the second by j/(i+ j)-th power.
This gives us
E[X i]≤ E[X i+ j]i/(i+ j)
E[X j]≤ E[X i+ j] j/(i+ j)
and we multiply the two inequalities to get the result.
ε-Nets
An ε-net on the n-dimensional unit sphere, Sn−1 := {x ∈ Rn : ‖x‖2 = 1}, is a finite set
Nε ⊂ Sn−1 such that for all y ∈ Sn−1, there is a vector x in the net within a Euclidean distance
ε > 0 of y, ‖x−y‖ ≤ ε . We have the following fact on the size of an ε-net on the unit sphere
[79, Lemma 5.2].
Fact 5.2.2 For all ε > 0, there exists an ε-net Nε on the unit sphere Sn−1 such that
|Nε | ≤
(
2
ε
+1
)n
.
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When A ∈ Rn×n is symmetric, we can estimate its norm from a net by the following
lemma [79, Lemma 5.4].
Lemma 5.2.3 Let A∈Rn×n be a symmetric matrix, Nε ⊂ Sn−1 be an ε-net on the n-dimensional
unit sphere for some ε ∈ (0,1). Then,
‖A‖= sup
y∈Sn−1
| 〈Ay,y〉 | ≤ 1
1−2ε maxx∈Nε | 〈Ax,x〉 |.
Approximate isometries and isotropy
A random vector over Rn is σ−isotropic if E[xxt ] = σ2In. When σ = 1, we simply say
the random vector is isotropic. Let x be isotropic and y ∈ Rn be arbitrary, then E[〈x,y〉2] =
ytE[xxt ]y = ‖y‖22.
Below is a lemma giving a condition which implies a matrix A ∈Rm×n is an approximate
isometry from Rn to Rm, measured by a small δ > 0 [79, Lemma 5.36].
Lemma 5.2.4 Let A ∈ Rm×n, δ > 0, α > 1, and ‖AtA− In‖ ≤ αmax(δ ,δ 2). Then,
1−αδ ≤ sn(A)≤ s1(A)≤ 1+αδ .
5.2.2 A Berstein-type Bound
Here we prove two lemmas: a bound on (X2−E[X2])’s moment generating function for
a subgaussian X and a Berstein-type concentration lemma needed for the main theorem [76,
Lemma 1.12].
Lemma 5.2.5 Let X be a subgaussian random variable with parameter s> 0. Then, the random
variable Z := X2−E[X2] satisfies
E[e2pitZ]≤ eCB·pit2s4
for all |t| ≤ 1/(8e2/e+1s2) and CB = 32e4/e+2/pi .
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Proof: We start with simply expanding the moment generating function and applying Jensen’s
inequality, ϕ(E[X ])≤ E[ϕ(X)] for any convex function ϕ(·).
E[exp(2pitZ)] = 1+∑
k≥2
(2pit)kE[(X2−E[X2])]k
k!
≤ 1+∑
k≥2
(2pit)kE[(X2−E[X2])k]
k!
≤ 1+∑
k≥2
2k−1(2pit)k ·2 ·E[X2k]
k!
.
The first inequality uses Jensen’s inequality, for the function φ(y) = yk with y≥ 0. The second
inequality is given by pairing 2k−1 terms of the form E[X2iX2 j]±E[X2i]E[X2 j], where i+ j = k,
and each term E[X2iX2 j]±E[X2i]E[X2 j] is less than 2E[X2k] by Lemma 5.2.2. Now, we can use
Lemma 5.2.1 to simplify.
= 1+∑
k≥2
(4pit)kE[X2k]
k!
≤ 1+∑
k≥2
(4pit)k(se1/e
√
2k/
√
2pi)2k
k!
= 1+∑
k≥2
(4ts2e2/ek)k
k!
.
Next, we use the bound k!≥ (k/e)k to get
E[exp(2pitZ)]≤ 1+∑
k≥2
(4ts2e1+2/e)k
= 1+(4ts2e1+2/e)2 ∑
k≥0
(4ts2e1+2/e)k.
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And finally, we restrict t ∈ (0, 1
8s2e1+2/e
) to get
E[exp(2pitZ)]≤ 1+2(4ts2e1+2/e)2
≤ exp(CB ·pit2s4)
for CB := 32e2+4/e/pi (the last inequality uses 1+ x≤ ex for x≥ 0).
Lemma 5.2.6 Let {Xi}n1 be iid subgaussian random variables with parameter s> 0, and let
X¯ :=
1
n∑i
(X2i −E[X2i ]),
then for all t > 0, we have
Pr{|X¯ |> t} ≤ 2 · exp
(
− n
CB
·min
{
t2
s4
,
t
s2
})
for CB := 32e
2+4/e
pi .
Proof: We proceed with the usual exponential Markov inequality. Fix CB = 32e4/e+2/pi as in the
previous lemma. Let δ ∈ (0,1/(8e2/e+1s2)] be arbitrary, Zi := X2i −E[X2i ], and S = nX¯ = ∑i Zi.
Pr[S > nt] = Pr[exp(2piδS)> exp(2piδnt)]
≤ exp(−2piδnt) ·E[exp(2piδS)]
= exp(−2piδnt) ·∏
i
E[exp(2piδZi)]
≤ exp(−2piδnt+nCBpiδ 2s4).
The first inequality is Markov’s, and the last inequality is from Lemma 5.2.5. Now we minimize
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the exponent as a function of δ . This yields δ = tCBs4 and in the case
t
CBs4
≤ 1
8e1+2/es2
, we have
Pr[X¯ > t]≤ exp
(
− n
CB
t2
s4
)
by substitution. If tCBs4 >
1
8e1+2/es2
(equivalently, t > 4e
1+2/es2
pi ),
Pr[X¯ > t]≤ exp
(
−n
[
pit
4e1+2/es2
− 1
2
])
by substitution with δ = 1
8e1+2/es2
. The further restriction on t (t > 4e
1+2/es2
pi or equivalently
tpi
8e1+2/es2
> 1/2) gives us pit
4e1+2/es2
− 12 is always at least pit8e1+2/es2 , which in-turn is always at least
t
CBs2
. This proves the lemma.
5.2.3 Proof of Theorem 5.2.1
Proof: First, we will use a net on the unit sphere to approximate a fixed A’s singular
values, then we will use the Bernstein-like lemma from the previous subsection, Lemma 5.2.6,
for a concentration bound on A’s distribution. And finally, we will use a union bound over the
entire net.
Let, CB = 32e
2+4/e
pi as in Lemma 5.2.6, C = 2
√
ln(9) ·CB = 8e1+2/e
√
ln9/
√
pi , δ :=
C(
√
n/m+ t/
√
m), and ε := s2/σ2 ·max(δ ,δ 2). Notice that Lemma 5.2.1’s proof gives us
σ < s, or s/σ > 1.
Step 1: approximation.
Here we will use a net along with Lemma 5.2.4, which allows us to reduce the proof to
showing ‖A′tA′− In‖ ≤ (s/σ)2 max(δ ,δ 2) where A′ := 1σ ·√mA. Let N ⊂ Sn−1 be a 1/4-net on
the n-dimensional unit sphere. Lemma 5.2.3 tells us
‖ 1
mσ2
AtA− In‖ ≤ 2max
x∈N
|
〈
(
1
mσ2
AtA− In)x,x
〉
|= 2max
x∈N
∣∣∣∣ 1mσ2‖Ax‖22−1
∣∣∣∣ .
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Next, we show with high probability (over A’s rows), we have
max
x∈N
∣∣∣∣ 1mσ2‖Ax‖22−1
∣∣∣∣≤ ε/2.
Step 2: concentration.
Here we use the Bernstein-type lemma, Lemma 5.2.6, to get a concentration bound on∣∣∣ 1mσ2‖Ax‖22−1∣∣∣ for a fixed x in the net. Express ‖Ax‖22 as a sum indexed by A’s rows:
‖Ax‖22 =
m
∑
i=1
〈ai,x〉2 .
Now we are concerned with the probability Pr
[∣∣∣ 1mσ2 ∑〈ai,x〉2−1∣∣∣≤ ε/2], and we can use
Lemma 5.2.6 since E[〈ai,x〉2] = σ2 by the definition of isotropic. For simplicity, re-scale the
matrix to A¯ := A/σ with rows a¯i. This matrix, A¯, has independent, centered, subgaussian rows
with parameter s/σ . Then, we have
Pr
[∣∣∣∣ 1m∑(〈a¯i,x〉2−1)
∣∣∣∣≤ ε/2]≤ 2exp(− mCB min
{
σ2ε
2s2
,
σ4ε2
4s4
})
≤ 2exp
(
− m
4CB
min
{
max(δ ,δ 2),max(δ 2,δ 4)
})
≤ 2exp
(
− m
4CB
δ 2
)
from Lemma 5.2.61. (The min-max argument results in δ 2 in both cases δ < 1 and δ ≥ 1.)
Using the inequality (a+b)2 ≥ a2+b2 for non-negative a,b gives us
Pr
[∣∣∣∣ 1m∑〈a¯i,x〉2−1
∣∣∣∣≤ ε/2]≤ 2exp(− ln(9)n− t2)
since C0 = 2
√
ln9 ·CB.
1We consider δ ≥ 1 and δ < 1 by using Lemma 5.2.6 in this step of the proof.
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X s¯1 σ(
√
m+CX (s/σ)2
√
n) observed CX Sample Var
P 71.26 71.43 .99/4pi .04
U {−1,1} 100.74 101.01 .99/2pi .05
N (0,1) 100.71 101.01 .99 .043
DZ,
√
2pi 100.77 101.01 .99 .06
X s¯n σ(
√
m−CX (s/σ)2
√
n) observed CX Sample Var
P 39.60 39.43 .99/4pi .017
U {−1,1} 56.00 55.76 .99/2pi .043
N (0,1) 55.92 55.76 .99 .036
DZ,
√
2pi 56.00 55.76 .99 .037
Figure 5.1. Data from 50 random matrices of dimension m = 6144×n = 512 for each distri-
butionX . The third column is the expected singular value using each distribution’s calculated
CX : 1, 1/2pi , and 1/4pi for discrete/continuous gaussians, U {−1,1}, andP respectively.
Step 3: union bound.
Finally, we take a union bound over all x ∈ N and from fact 5.2.2 we have that |N| ≤ 9n.
This gives us
Pr[∃ x ∈ N : 1
m∑〈a¯i,x〉
2−1> ε/2]≤ 9n ·2exp(− ln(9)n− t2)
= 2exp(−t2).
The proof is complete by Lemma 5.2.4.
5.2.4 Experiments
Here we present empirical data on the singular values of random matrices with inde-
pendent entries drawn from commonly-used distributions in lattice-based cryptography. These
distributions are the continuous gaussian, the discrete gaussian over Z, U {−1,1}, and the
distribution given by choosing 0 with probability 1/2 and ±1 each with probability 1/4, which
we denote asP . For each distribution, we sampled 50 m = 6144 by n = 512 random matrices
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and measured their singular values, and assumed the singular values were approximately
s1 ≈ σ
(√
m+CX (s/σ)2
√
n
)
sn ≈ σ
(√
m−CX (s/σ)2
√
n
)
where CX is a small constant dependent on the distribution X . These results are given in
Figure 5.1.
Continuous and Discrete Gaussians
The continuous gaussian Dσ is subgaussian with parameter σ/
√
2pi since2 E[e2pitX ] =
epit
2σ2 where X ∼ Dσ . Further, the discrete gaussian DΛ,s is subgaussian with parameter s,
independent of the smoothing parameter of Λ, for any lattice Λ [66, Lemma 2.8]. Assuming that
the discrete gaussian is smooth, then one can expect the standard deviation of DZ,r to be close to
the standard deviation of the continuous gaussian it approximates, r/
√
2pi . This implies the ratio
between the subgaussian parameter and the standard deviation of (discrete) gaussians is one or
nearly one. Under this assumption, we observed Cgaussian = 1.
Uniform over {−1,1}
Here σ = 1 and E[e2pitX ] = cosh2pit ≤ e2pi2t2 , or the subgaussian parameter is at most
2pi . We observed CU {−1,1} = 1/2pi in our experiment.
The DistributionP
By nearly the same steps as the previous distribution,P is subgaussian with parameter
2pi and σ = 1/
√
2. Then, we observed a CP = 1/4pi . We note that for all four distributions we
observed CX (s/σ)2 ≈ 1.
As a second experiment, we repeated the first experiment for a fixed X =U {−1,1}
but with varying dimensions. This experiment’s data for s1 is shown in Figure 5.2, graphed
2Dσ = N(0,σ/
√
2pi) where N(0,σ) is the normal distribution with variance σ2.
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Figure 5.2. Here X = {−1,1}. For each n = 50,100,200,500,1000, the experi-
ment sampled N = 50 random n by 32n matrices and averaged their largest singu-
lar value. The measured constant CX approached 1/2pi from below as n increased
(.92/2pi, .96/2pi, .97/2pi, .99/2pi, .99/2pi).
with the expected largest singular value. We remark that we saw the same behavior for all four
distributions when we varied the dimension.
5.2.5 Applications
Here we show how the updated singular value estimates from the previous subsection
impact concrete security of lattice trapdoor schemes. As an example, we use the [66] trapdoor
scheme with entries drawn independently from P . Since the singular values scale with σ =
1/
√
2, the concrete security of the underlying SIS problem increases. See Figure 5.3 for the
difference in a commonly-used parameter regime.
In order to estimate security, we followed [8, 7], in using sieving as the SVP oracle with
time complexity 2.292k+16.4 in the block size, k. BKZ is expected to return a vector of length
δ 2ndet1/2n for a lattice of dimension 2n (Minkowski’s theorem tells us a short enough lattice
vector exists when we only use 2n columns of A). Hence, we found the smallest block size
k achieving the needed δ corresponding to forging a signature, s
√
m√
q = δ
2n. Finally, we used
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Parameters Original Updated
n 512 512
q 224 224
s 2881 2037
m 24804 24804
Bit Sec. 124 136
δ 1.0046 1.0043
k 324 364
Figure 5.3. The change in concrete security of the underlying SIS problem in MP12 when the
trapdoor is drawn fromPm×n. We give the smallest BKZ block size k achieving the δ needed to
find a vector of length s
√
m in (a subspace of) the lattice Λ⊥q (A).
the heuristic δ ≈ ( k2pie(pik)1/k)1/2(k−1) to determine the relationship between k and δ , and we
set the total time complexity of BKZ with block-size k, dimension 2n as 8 · (2n) · time(SVP) =
8 · (2n) ·2.292k+16.4 [35, 8].
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